70
In addition, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the transmission of traffic data and
location data to a third party constitutes interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, regardless of how that data is subsequently used. In that regard, it does
not matter whether the information in question relating to persons’ private lives is sensitive or whether
the persons concerned have been inconvenienced in any way on account of that interference (see, to
that effect, Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592,
paragraphs 124 and 126 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du
Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, paragraphs 115 and 116).
71
The interference with the right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter entailed by the transmission of
traffic data and location data to the security and intelligence agencies must be regarded as being
particularly serious, bearing in mind inter alia the sensitive nature of the information which that data
may provide and, in particular, the possibility of establishing a profile of the persons concerned on the
basis of that data, such information being no less sensitive than the actual content of communications.
In addition, it is likely to generate in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private
lives are the subject of constant surveillance (see, by analogy, judgments of 8 April 2014, Digital
Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraphs 27 and 37, and of
21 December 2016, Tele2, C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraphs 99 and 100).
72
It should also be noted that the transmission of traffic data and location data to public authorities for
security purposes is liable, in itself, to infringe the right to respect for communications, enshrined in
Article 7 of the Charter, and to deter users of means of electronic communication from exercising their
freedom of expression, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter. Such deterrence may affect, in
particular, persons whose communications are subject, according to national rules, to the obligation of
professional secrecy and whistle-blowers whose actions are protected by Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who
report breaches of Union law (OJ 2019 L 305, p. 17). Moreover, that deterrent effect is all the more
serious given the quantity and breadth of the data retained (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 April
2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 28; of
21 December 2016, Tele2, C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 101; and of 6 October
2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, paragraph 118).
73
Lastly, given the significant amount of traffic data and location data that can be retained continuously
by a general retention measure and the sensitive nature of the information which that data may provide,
the mere retention of that data by the providers of electronic communications services entails a risk of
abuse and unlawful access.
74
As regards the objectives that may justify such interferences, and in particular the objective of
safeguarding national security, at issue in the main proceedings, it should be noted, at the outset, that
Article 4(2) TEU provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
That responsibility corresponds to the primary interest in protecting the essential functions of the State
and the fundamental interests of society and encompasses the prevention and punishment of activities
capable of seriously destabilising the fundamental constitutional, political, economic or social
structures of a country and, in particular, of directly threatening society, the population or the State
itself, such as terrorist activities (judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others,
C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, paragraph 135).
75
The importance of the objective of safeguarding national security, read in the light of Article 4(2)
TEU, goes beyond that of the other objectives referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, inter
alia the objectives of combating crime in general, even serious crime, and of safeguarding public
security. Threats such as those referred to in paragraph 74 above can be distinguished, by their nature
and particular seriousness, from the general risk that tensions or disturbances, even of a serious nature,
affecting public security will arise. Subject to meeting the other requirements laid down in
Article 52(1) of the Charter, the objective of safeguarding national security is therefore capable of
justifying measures entailing more serious interferences with fundamental rights than those which
might be justified by those other objectives (judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and
Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, paragraph 136).