its scope in more detail. Instead, it always permits information in the individual case
if this is necessary to perform the above duties.
However, in view of the information content of the data in question, which in itself is
limited, and their great importance for an effective performance of duties, the reach of
this provision is constitutionally unobjectionable. In this connection, account must be
taken of the fact that it by no means permits information to be given indiscriminately.
On the contrary, there is a restrictive effect in the fact that information under § 113.1
sentence 1 TKG are called for in the individual case and must be necessary. In relation to warding off danger, which the legislature has expressly not defined as including risk precaution, a prudent interpretation reveals that a “concrete danger” within
the meaning of the “general clauses” (Generalklauseln) of police law is a requirement
for such information. Admittedly, this threshold is low and also admits the suspicion of
dangers. Equally, it does not in advance restrict information to persons endangering
public security within the meaning of general police and regulatory law. However, this
does not relieve it from restriction to such an extent as to be disproportionate in view
of its limited weight of encroachment. In particular it does not enable information as a
general means for lawful administrative enforcement, but in the individual case it requires the duty in question to have a security-law character. It is true that in regard to
the intelligence services, which in general act in advance, irrespective of concrete
dangers, there is no comparable threshold of encroachment. But this is justified by
the restricted duties of the intelligence services, which are not directly aimed at police
measures, but only at a duty to provide reports to the politically responsible state bodies or to the public. Apart from this, it follows here too from the requirement of necessity in the individual case that information under § 113.1 sentence 1 TKG must be required in order to successfully investigate a particular action or group which requires
observation by the security authorities. Insofar as information relates to the prosecution of criminal offences and regulatory offences, the requirement of necessity in the
individual case means that there must at least be an initial suspicion.
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Taken together, these thresholds are not high, but they are constitutionally acceptable. In this connection, it must be taken into account in comparison to § 112 TKG
that a manual information procedure entails certain procedural efforts on the part of
the retrieving authority, which is likely to encourage the authority to obtain the information only where it is sufficiently needed.
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b) § 113.1 sentence 1 TKG is not disproportionate by reason of the fact that in addition to the data covered by § 111.1 TKG it also includes the data under § 95 TKG in
the duty of information. The legislature is in principle not prevented from permitting
access to further telecommunications data – not covered by § 111 TKG – which the
telecommunications enterprises store to perform their contracts. § 111 TKG is intended to secure a minimum amount of data. But this does not exclude the possibility that
in a dynamic sector like telecommunications other data may also be important for the
performance of government duties and may be made accessible. It need not be decided here whether or how far the duties of information also extend to information
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