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separate interference with the fundamental rights referred to in the preceding paragraph, irrespective
of the subsequent use made of it (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of
26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592, paragraphs 124 and 126).
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That conclusion is all the more justified since traffic and location data may reveal information on a
significant number of aspects of the private life of the persons concerned, including sensitive
information such as sexual orientation, political opinions, religious, philosophical, societal or other
beliefs and state of health, given that such data moreover enjoys special protection under EU law.
Taken as a whole, that data may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private
lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or
temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social
relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them. In particular, that
data provides the means of establishing a profile of the individuals concerned, information that is no
less sensitive, having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of communications (see,
to that effect, judgments of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238,
paragraph 27, and of 21 December 2016, Tele2, C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970,
paragraph 99).

118

Therefore, first, the retention of traffic and location data for policing purposes is liable, in itself, to
infringe the right to respect for communications, enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, and to deter
users of electronic communications systems from exercising their freedom of expression,
guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 April 2014, Digital
Rights, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 28, and of 21 December 2016, Tele2,
C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 101). Such deterrence may affect, in particular,
persons whose communications are subject, according to national rules, to the obligation of
professional secrecy and whistleblowers whose actions are protected by Directive (EU) 2019/1937
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who
report breaches of Union law (OJ 2019 L 305, p. 17). Moreover, that deterrent effect is all the more
serious given the quantity and breadth of data retained.

119

Second, in view of the significant quantity of traffic and location data that may be continuously
retained under a general and indiscriminate retention measure, as well as the sensitive nature of the
information that may be gleaned from that data, the mere retention of such data by providers of
electronic communications services entails a risk of abuse and unlawful access.

120

That being said, in so far as Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 allows Member States to introduce
the derogations referred to in paragraph 110 above, that provision reflects the fact that the rights
enshrined in Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter are not absolute rights, but must be considered in
relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, Facebook Ireland
and Schrems, C‑311/18, EU:C:2020:559, paragraph 172 and the case-law cited).

121

Indeed, as can be seen from Article 52(1) of the Charter, that provision allows limitations to be
placed on the exercise of those rights, provided that those limitations are provided for by law, that
they respect the essence of those rights and that, in compliance with the principle of proportionality,
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

122

Thus, in order to interpret Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 in the light of the Charter, account
must also be taken of the importance of the rights enshrined in Articles 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the Charter
and of the importance of the objectives of protecting national security and combating serious crime
in contributing to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

123

In that regard, Article 6 of the Charter, to which the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France) and
the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court, Belgium) refer, lays down the right of every
individual not only to liberty but also to security and guarantees rights corresponding to those

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