IPCO Annual Report 2017
• Errors when a public authority has, as a consequence of relying on the wrong data,
initiated a course of action that has an adverse impact on someone (for example, sharing
information with another public authority stating a person is suspected of a crime; when
an individual is visited or a search warrant is executed; or there is an arrest).
• Errors which result in the wrongful disclosure of a large volume of communications data
or a particularly sensitive data set.
14.30
In cases where an error may have potentially occurred, an in-depth and detailed investigation
is conducted to determine the circumstances and impact. During 2017, IPCO and IOCCO
undertook 33 serious-error investigations (this broadly matched the numbers for 2016).
24 cases were classified as serious errors, whilst 9 were not assessed as not meeting the
above criteria.
14.31
A description of the 24 cases assessed as serious are set out in Annex B.
14.32
19 of these were a result of human error and there were five system or technical errors,
such as a system fault. The cases involving human error included instances in which data
was misinterpreted and when data was entered incorrectly.
14.33
The impact of errors can be wide-ranging, including:
• executing a search warrant at an address of someone unconnected with an investigation
or when individuals unconnected with the investigation are arrested. There were 11 cases
in this category (19 people were affected, in that they were arrested or interviewed);
• the police visiting the home or work address of an individual with no sustainable link with
an investigation. There were 7 cases in this category (10 people affected);
• delaying a welfare check on an individual potentially at risk (e.g. a young person at risk
of sexual exploitation) because one or more incorrect addresses were investigated (in
some cases wrong addresses were visited). There were six cases in this category
(six people affected);
14.34
Errors in this context can have grave consequences for the victim of the mistake, together
with his or her family and friends. This is particularly evident when homes or offices are
searched and the nature of the investigation is revealed to members of the individual’s
family, and his or her neighbours or employer. Children are at risk of being taken into care
and individuals in notifiable, and other, occupations may be suspended or dismissed. Strict
bail conditions can result in a suspect having to leave his or her home. The analysis of
computers, tablets and telephones can take a protracted period of time. Not infrequently
it is only when nothing of suspicion is found on the electronic equipment which has
been seized that consideration is given to the possibility that there was an error by the
authorities in transcribing the information which links a particular device or an address
to the communications data.
14.35
In January 2017 the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) published a series of ‘good
practice guides’aimed at curbing the number of errors that occur when a public authority
seeks to identify the user of a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address. These were based, at
least in part, on recommendations from reports by IOCCO and IPCO. Indeed, the complexity
of internet protocol address resolution (IPAR) was highlighted in IOCCO’s final annual report.
In a section devoted entirely to IPAR, the report detailed the many opportunities for error
when a public authority seeks to resolve an IP address.
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