92
IPCO Annual Report 2017
These are broken down as follows:
Fig. 16 T otal breaches reported under Part 3 of Police Act 1997 and Part 2
of RIPA or RIP(S)A during 2017
8
9
%
29
54
Directed surveillance
Property interference
Intrusive surveillance
CHIS (including
undercover officers)
14.12
The breaches, as reflected by these figures, vary in their seriousness. It is of particular note
that the number of errors for covert activities remains reassuringly small. As the Chief
Surveillance Commissioner has previously observed, some of the incidents are very minor
in nature, on occasion scarcely meriting inclusion. That said, it is reassuring that the various
organisations adopt a stance of over-reporting rather than under-reporting.
14.13
The following are examples of breaches reported to the OSC and IPCO during 2017:
• An authorisation was granted by a Senior Authorising Officer for the deployment of an
audio recording device inside the vehicle of an individual of interest. This required an
authorisation for property interference under Part 3 of the Police Act 1997 (installing
the device and thereby interfering with the vehicle) and for intrusive surveillance
under Part II of RIPA (downloading, recording and listening to conversations recorded
by the device). The property interference authorisation was active from the moment
of signature, but the authorisation for intrusive surveillance was not effective until
approval had been obtained from a Surveillance Commissioner (under the OSC’s
regime). Due to human error, the technical surveillance team was advised that both
activities could be commenced before the Surveillance Commissioner had made a
decision. As soon as the error was appreciated, the recording was stopped and an
urgent authorisation was obtained to enable the intrusive surveillance to restart. A full
internal review was undertaken by the police force to avoid repetition and the results
were shared with IPCO.
• A number of Facebook records were accessed by investigators as part of a murder
enquiry, in order to investigate the communications between the suspects. The records
were accessed over a protracted period of time. Whilst an authorisation for directed
surveillance, with one-sided consent, had been obtained in relation to some of the
suspects, this was exceeded as the investigation developed to encompass others. Once
this was identified, the police force implemented a number of remedial steps. These
included additional training, specific advice for the relevant officers, and changes to the
practice for making requests of this kind. The breach was reported to the CPS and the
material was not used during the subsequent proceedings.