62
IPCO Annual Report 2017
9.7
In the ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, the government gives a number of examples which
describe how the powers have been of assistance in, for instance, countering terrorist activity
when combined with complex analysis. These examples include preventing bombings,
kidnaps and mass casualty attacks on aviation, and it is explained how they assisted in
catching perpetrators after an attack. It is contended that if the intelligence agencies had
had to rely on acquiring targeted communications data these operations would have had
different – and worse – outcomes.
9.8
In his review of bulk powers48 Lord Anderson concluded that:
“Bulk acquisition has been demonstrated to be crucial in a variety of fields, including
counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and counter-proliferation. The case studies provide
examples in which bulk acquisition has contributed significantly to the disruption of
terrorist operations and, though that disruption, almost certainly the saving of lives.’
Bulk acquisition is valuable as a basis for action in the face of imminent threat, though
its principal utility lies in swift target identification and development.
The SIAs’ [Security & Intelligence Agencies] ability to interrogate the aggregated data
obtained through bulk acquisition cannot, at least with currently available technology,
be matched through the use of data obtained by targeted means.
Even where alternatives might be available, they are frequently more intrusive than
the use of bulk acquisition.”
Statistics of use of powers
9.9
There were 15 extant s.94 Directions in 2017 which related to MI5 and GCHQ.
9.10
MI5 made 20,503 applications in 2017 to access communications data obtained pursuant
to s.94 directions. These applications related to 98,798 items of communications data.49
9.11
In 2017, 9.4% of GCHQ’s end product reports included material acquired under s.94.50
The authorisation process
9.12
Authorisation is a four part process. Some of the steps may happen simultaneously:
• the agency identifies and describes the bulk communications data it considers it needs
to meet its operational objectives;
• the agency identifies the relevant public electronic communications network/s (PECN)51
and consults with them to assess whether acquiring specific communications data in bulk
48 Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016 –
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
49 In 2016, MI5 made 19,995 applications to access bulk communications data. These applications related to 97,382 items of
communications data.
50 In 2016, 7.5% of GCHQ’s end product reports included material acquired under section 94.
51 A public electronic communications network (PECN) is defined in section 151 of the Communications Act (2003) as: ‘an electronic
communications network provided wholly or mainly for the purpose of making electronic communications services available to
members of the public.’ This excludes those who provide services or networks that are not available to members of the public (typically,
private networks and other bespoke services). PECNs tend to be bodies which would be referred to as CSPs under RIPA, the IPA and in
other parts of this report. For simplicity we refer to them as CSPs in this chapter.