IPCO Annual Report 2017
7.7
To issue an interception warrant for any other purpose would be unlawful, and it is part of
our oversight function to ensure that all warrants are issued only when necessary for these
statutory purposes. The Secretary of State may not issue an interception warrant unless he
or she believes that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought
to be achieved.
7.8
Targeted warrants must name or describe one person as the interception subject, or a single
set of premises as the location to which the interception relates.33 In contrast, a bulk warrant
does not have to name or describe a person as the subject of the interception or a single
set of premises as the target of the interception. Bulk interception warrants are only for the
interception of ‘external’ communications (communications sent or received outside the
British Islands). The warrant can include intercepting communications which are not external
if this step is necessary in order to intercept the external communications to which the
warrant relates. Put generally, targeted warrants are essentially an investigatory tool for use
once a subject for interception is identified, while bulk warrants are primarily an intelligence
gathering capability.
7.9
The intercepting agency has to take a number of steps to ensure it intercepts the minimum
amount of material in order to obtain the information covered by the warrant. This
includes using its knowledge of the way in which international communications are routed
and conducting regular surveys of the relevant communications links in order to identify
the communications carriers that are most likely to hold relevant material. The agency
must carry out interception in ways that limit collection of non‑external communications
to the minimum.
7.10
Bulk warrants do not necessarily seek to limit the quantity of external communications which
are to be intercepted.34 Provided the bulk interception requirements in the legislation are
met, the interception of all communications transmitted via a particular route or cable,
or carried by a particular Communication Service Provider (CSP), can properly be lawfully
authorised. However, under RIPA, the Secretary of State provides a certificate which
describes at least a part of the material that is to be intercepted, and he or she certifies
that examining this material is necessary for one or more of the statutory purposes.
Examining material for any other purpose would be unlawful.
7.11
There is a limit to how much we can say in a public document about the interception
of communications because of the statutory secrecy provisions contained in RIPA (and
replicated in the IPA). These provisions place a duty on anyone involved in interception
to keep secret certain aspects of the interception process including, for example, the
existence and contents of a warrant, the steps taken to enforce a warrant, and everything
in the intercepted material or any related communications data.
7.12
The restrictions on what we are able to discuss in this report self-evidently do not limit how
we oversee the use of these powers. All those involved in intercepting communications
are required to disclose to the IPC all the information he needs to carry out his oversight
functions and we have full and unrestricted access to all of the information and material
we require.
33 F1 RIPA 8 (1) refs.
34 Para 6.2 Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2016.
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