18
IPCO Annual Report 2017
was gained. The inspectors will focus on the welfare of the CHIS and his or her security,
and whether the risk assessments were properly compiled. Our resources do not enable
us to consider all the use of adult CHIS; instead we look at a representative sample of the
authorisations during an inspection and a similar sample of undercover authorisations.
By contrast, we look at every instance of the (notably infrequent) use of juvenile CHIS.
3.28
In addition, at MI5 and law enforcement agency inspections we focus on how the agency
has applied its own guidelines to covert human intelligence sources who participate in
criminality. The Prime Minister avowed oversight of this previously secret area of ‘directed’
oversight on 6 March 2018. Sir John Goldring, the Deputy Investigatory Powers Commissioner
and former Intelligence Services Commissioner, has particular responsibility for our
inspections of the intelligence agencies and MOD CHIS.
3.29
As already observed above, we visit the majority of local authorities for their inspections.
However, we also utilise remote desktop inspections when a local authority has significantly
reduced or stopped using their powers in this context and when there are no apparent
significant compliance concerns. A desktop inspection will always be followed by an onsite
inspection. Inspectors review the authority’s policies and procedures; their approach to
training; the use that has been made of the relevant intrusive powers; and a sample of the
paperwork underpinning the authorisations. The OSC only carried out desktop inspections
for district or borough councils in England.13 We continue to inspect on site any local
authority or Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) that has used its directed surveillance or CHIS
powers during the preceding period, or, as set out above, when the previous inspection
was a desktop inspection.14
3.30
For renewals of law enforcement undercover officers, our inspectors examine how
the officer has been utilised. This includes the detail of how they are managed, the
assessments that were made as to their safety and the procedures that should ensure the
public authority’s duty of care is properly applied, as well as the reasons for any renewal.
Findings
3.31
Broadly, we were impressed by a high degree of compliance with the statutory framework
in this area. Although instances of failure to follow the processes and procedures were
identified, these were not in any sense systemic. This can be a key investigative tool for public
authorities and it was reassuring to note that whatever the historic problems may have been,
they were not evident in the period under review.
3.32
The risk of obtaining confidential information is a particular concern. It must be recorded
in the authorisation if a CHIS is to be tasked to obtain material in this category and the
applicant should always consider whether this is a likelihood. In general, the intelligence
agencies are cautious in their approach when potentially faced with confidential material,
providing protections that are arguably, in some cases, unnecessary. Proportionality has
been comprehensively addressed in these cases, which have been approved at a suitably
senior level.
13 But excluding London Boroughs. In 2018 we extended this practice to Scotland and Wales, for all types of council and to the
Fire and Rescue Services (‘FRS’).
14 In the period 01/04/2017 – 31/12/2017 no FRS reported using their CHIS powers.