16
IPCO Annual Report 2017
The Authorisation Process
3.14
Often CHIS relationships start after a referral. This might be, for instance, when someone
indicates they have information of possible use to a public authority or when a public
authority identifies that an individual may be of assistance. Before deciding whether
someone is suitable to be a CHIS – certainly before making an approach – public authorities
should consider a number of issues, including the potential value of any likely intelligence
weighed against possible vulnerabilities such as mental health concerns, drug use or age.
3.15
A senior manager,8 for example a superintendent in the police, must authorise a CHIS
relationship before this step can be taken. The authorising officer (AO) acts in a quasi judicial
role when considering such requests. They must be impartial and, wherever possible,
separate from the investigation itself. The AO can seek relevant information or legal advice,
but the decision whether or not to grant an authorisation is for them alone. By way of
an exception, when the CHIS is a vulnerable individual or juvenile, the request must be
authorised at more a senior level.
3.16
The CHIS code of practice provides particular safeguards for legally privileged and other
categories of sensitive material, for instance when there is a higher expectation of privacy
or confidentiality such as parliamentary, journalistic, medical or spiritual information. For the
intelligence agencies, when the CHIS deployment is intended to facilitate obtaining, providing
access to or disclosing material which is subject to legal privilege, the authorising officer must
request written approval in advance from the Secretary of State. For LEAs and OPAs a higher
level of authorisations, such as by a Chief Constable, must be obtained when privileged or
confidential information is likely to be acquired.
3.17
Local Authorities in England and Wales can only use CHIS in accordance with The
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and Statutory Instrument 2012/1500, which require
a magistrate to approve the deployment. The proposed activity must be shown to be
necessary for the prevention or detection of a crime which carries a minimum sentence
of six months’ imprisonment, or because it relates to an offence of selling alcohol or tobacco
products to minors.
3.18
In Scotland, where RIPSA applies, local authorities are not restricted by The Protection of
Freedoms Act 2012 when they use CHIS, and they may authorise this activity on the grounds
of prevention or detection of crime or preventing disorder, and in the interests of public
safety and public health. In Northern Ireland local authorities also use these powers but IPCO
does not have oversight as to how they use them (see the section on findings below).
3.19
A CHIS authorisation is valid for 12 months, except for juvenile CHIS which were valid for one
month during the period covered by this report9 unless renewed. In urgent situations, public
authorities can apply for an oral authorisation which is valid for only 72 hours, after which
the normal written process must be followed.
3.20
Within the public authority there will be a ‘handler’ who has day-to-day responsibility for
dealing with the source on behalf of the authority and for the source’s security and welfare.
Another individual within the public authority, known as the ‘controller’, will have general
oversight of the use made of the source. A risk assessment will be produced which covers
8
9
The specific role or ranks are prescribed in The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence
Sources) Order 2010 SI 2010/521.
now four months.