IPCO Annual Report 2017
14.70
The graph below shows a breakdown of errors by investigatory power.
Fig.19 Number of errors reported by agency and warrant issuing department
4
2
1
14
7
12
14.71
Sec on 7
CHIS
BPD
Directed surveillance
Property and intrusive
Data
The largest number of errors reported was in relation to CHIS activity; 10 of these related
to SIS. 12 errors related to Directed Surveillance, of which 11 were reported by the MI5.
All 7 errors in relation to property interference and or intrusive surveillance were reported
by MI5. Both GCHQ errors were in relation to activities authorised under Section 7 of the
Intelligence Services Act. 3 of the 4 BPD errors were reported by MI5 and the other by SIS.
Data errors
14.72
There was one complex error reported by MI5 in relation to the retention of data on an area
within their IT systems. MI5 is undertaking work to remedy this problem and delete data
which has been retained erroneously.
CHIS and undercover activity
14.73
All the errors in this area resulted in unauthorised interference with privacy. The majority of
the errors related to unauthorised activity in the UK by SIS agents. This typically occurred
where an agent normally operating overseas was met and tasked, or conducted online activity,
whilst in the UK. This was routinely the result of human error and SIS has put a number of
measures in place to ensure that officers are aware to a greater extent than hitherto of the
requirements under RIPA. All four MI5 CHIS errors related to a failure to renew authorisations
before they expired (largely the result of misinterpreting renewal dates).
Directed surveillance
14.74
In one operation, SIS failed to obtain a DSA to cover the audio recording device element of an
operation resulting in unauthorised intrusion. The majority of MI5 errors in this area related
to a failure to renew authorisations before they expired resulting in periods of unauthorised
intrusion into privacy. One error was a failure to obtain the correct level of authorisations
in relation to LPP material. Each of these cases was the result of human error, addressed
by speaking to the officers and teams involved and, in some cases, through issuing new
guidance and introducing new procedures. In one case MI5 equipment was deployed in a
way that resulted in the over collection of data and therefore constituted an unauthorised
interference with privacy. In this instance the MI5 updated their operational procedures
to ensure future deployments of this equipment were fully compliant.
103