10
IPCO Annual Report 2017
I considered that it was in the public interest to resolve as many potential difficulties as
possible before commencement of the main elements of the Act. I will report on the
effectiveness of this approach in the next annual report.
The IPCO approach
2.9
As already indicated, the two most important early priorities were establishing the IPCO
team and the processes that will enable the Commissioners to consider the applications
for warrants. These have both been very substantial undertakings but, subject still to the
appointment of some key staff, they are now essentially – and, I suggest, successfully
– complete. Our focus for the next stage will be on creating the most effective possible
inspection regime across the entirety of the many bodies for which we have responsibility,
bearing in mind that IPCO is, in one sense, the result of a merger of three very distinct
precursor organisations. We have recently started the work that will be necessary to unify
our approach to inspections. Indeed, some months ago we instituted inspections across
the former operational boundaries to ensure that we apply consistent standards to the
authorities we oversee. Inspections of the intelligence agencies have already changed
fundamentally. Previously they were inspected by the Intelligence Services Commissioner,
accompanied by a member of his staff. Since early 2017, when the IOCC and ISComm
offices were brought together under one Head of Office (in effect, the Chief Executive),
two inspectors, directed by the relevant Commissioner (my Deputy, Sir John Goldring),
have been conducting inspections focussing on six themes:
• S.7 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA) and the Consolidated Guidance
• Property Interference and Intrusive Surveillance;
• Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources;
• Communications Data and Bulk Communications Data;
• Bulk Personal Data; and
• Interception.
2.10
The Commissioners will regularly attend part or all of these inspections, and oversee the
work of the inspectors, and I am firmly of the view that the new model has given us greater
flexibility and reach than under the previous approach. We plan to expand the cadre of
inspectors assisting with intelligence work. My understanding is that the agencies recognise
and accept the benefits of these changes to the inspection regime.
2.11
There is a strong symbiotic connection between the ex post facto inspections we conduct
and the Commissioners’ judicial review function. It is of note that for countries with broadly
equivalent oversight bodies, while some combine the oversight and review function in one
body, many have divided them between separate organisations. This latter approach is
favoured by many in civil society. My strong view is that having responsibility for both elements
makes my overall oversight of the intelligence and law enforcement agencies significantly
more effective than would be achieved by two separate bodies. The Commissioners are able
to identify areas which merit particular scrutiny on inspection, and the inspectors are well
placed to inform the JCs of the issues of relevance to future applications for warrants that were
identified on inspections. The Government, as a result of this regime, needs to engage
with IPCO on an extensive range of issues which are identified on inspections, to ensure
effective compliance before the Commissioners are asked to approve applications. IPCO’s
ability to analyse the circumstances surrounding and relevant to warrants during inspections
means that it is reasonable to include less background material in the applications than is
sometimes seen in jurisdictions where the two functions have been separated. For example,