SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUGDMENT
38
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements
of Article 13 (art. 13), the aggregate of remedies provided for under
domestic law may do so (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned X v.
the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 46, p. 26, § 60, and the Van
Droogenbroeck judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 32, § 56);
(d) neither Article 13 (art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays down
for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their
internal law the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the
Convention - for example, by incorporating the Convention into domestic
law (see the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union judgment of 6 February 1976,
Series A no. 2O, p. 18, § 50).
It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the application of
Article 13 (art. 13) in a given case will depend upon the manner in which
the Contracting State concerned has chosen to discharge its obligation under
Article 1 (art. 1) directly to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms set out in section I (see the above-mentioned Ireland v. the
United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 25, p. 91, § 239).
114. In the present case, it was not suggested that any remedies were
available to the applicants other than the four channels of complaint
examined by the Commission, namely an application to the Board of
Visitors, an application to the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, a petition to the Home Secretary and the institution of
proceedings before the English courts.
115. As regards the first two channels, the Court, like the Commission,
considers that they do not constitute an "effective remedy" for the present
purposes.
The Board of Visitors cannot enforce its conclusions (see paragraph 52
above) nor can it entertain applications from individuals like Mrs. Colne
who are not in prison.
As regards the Parliamentary Commissioner, it suffices to note that he
has himself no power to render a binding decision granting redress (see
paragraph 54 above).
116. As for the Home Secretary, if there were a complaint to him as to
the validity of an Order or Instruction under which a measure of control
over correspondence had been carried out, he could not be considered to
have a sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of
Article 13 (art. 13) (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and
others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 26, § 56): as the author of the directives
in question, he would in reality be judge in his own cause. The position,
however, would be otherwise if the complainant alleged that a measure of
control resulted from a misapplication of one of those directives. The Court
is satisfied that in such cases a petition to the Home Secretary would in
general be effective to secure compliance with the directive, if the complaint
was well-founded. The Court notes, however, that even in these cases, at