SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUGDMENT
34
April 1974, and Mr. Carne’s letters nos. 43, 45, 53, 54, 56, 58 and 59 and
his further letters of 27 December 1974 and 11 January 1975;
(e) the petition aspect of the prohibition on attempts to stimulate public
agitation or petition (see paragraphs 45 (a), item (xi), and 70 above): Mr.
McMahon’s letters nos. 32 and 34;
(f) prohibition on letters evading or circumventing the regulations (see
paragraphs 44 and 62 above): Mr. Silver’s letter no. 1 and Mr. Tuttle’s letter
no. 18.
As regards item (f), the Commission considered that the measure,
although taken on an intrinsically legitimate ground, was excessive. In the
remaining cases, on the other hand, it was the ground itself as well as the
measure which did not correspond to a necessity, within the meaning of
Article 8 § 2 (art. 8-2); the Commission expressed the same opinion as
regards the stopping, on the principal or subsidiary grounds indicated in
sub-paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of paragraph 91 above, of the letters
listed in those sub-paragraphs. Finally, the Commission considered that the
stopping of Mr. Cooper’s letters nos. 19, 21 and 25 (see paragraph 71
above) was not "necessary".
The Government did not contest these findings on the part of the
Commission, and the Court sees no reason to disagree. It therefore holds
that the stopping of the letters in question was not "necessary in a
democratic society".
(b) Contested items
100. As regards certain letters, the Government or the applicants
contested the Commission’s findings on the "necessity" issue. In accordance
with the President’s Order of 22 July 1982 (see paragraph 6 above),
argument was presented to the Court at the hearings on these items, which
will be considered in turn.
101. Mr. Noe’s letter no. 10 to a solicitor was stopped as it contained a
reference to a business transaction (see paragraphs 41, 46 and 60 above).
The Commission found it not to be established that the interference was
"necessary in a democratic society", notably because there was no
supporting evidence to that effect. The Government contested this
conclusion.
The Court notes that this letter - written by a prisoner convicted of fraud
(see paragraph 13 above) - did not simply concern legal problems but
interpretations (see paragraph 60 above). Without expressing any opinion
on the restrictions in force at the relevant time on the conduct by prisoners
of business activities in general, the Court considers, making due allowance
for the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation, that the authorities were
entitled to think that the stopping of this particular letter was necessary "for
the prevention of disorder or crime", within the meaning of Article 8 § 2
(art. 8-2) of the Convention.