29
SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUGDMENT
practice which had to be followed save in exceptional circumstances (see
paragraphs 26 and 27 above). In these conditions, the Court considers that
although those directives did not themselves have the force of law, they may
- to the admittedly limited extent to which those concerned were made
sufficiently aware of their contents - be taken into account in assessing
whether the criterion of foreseeability was satisfied in the application of the
Rules.
89. For this reason, the Court cannot accept the applicants’ additional
contention that the conditions and procedures governing interferences with
correspondence - and in particular the directives set out in the Orders and
Instructions - should be contained in the substantive law itself.
90. The applicants further contended that the law itself must provide
safeguards against abuse.
The Government recognised that the correspondence control system must
itself be subject to control and the Court finds it evident that some form of
safeguards must exist. One of the principles underlying the Convention is
the rule of law, which implies that an interference by the authorities with an
individual’s rights should be subject to effective control (see, inter alia, the
Klass and others judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, pp. 25-26,
§ 55). This is especially so where, as in the present case, the law bestows on
the executive wide discretionary powers, the application whereof is a matter
of practice which is susceptible to modification but not to any Parliamentary
scrutiny (see paragraph 26 above).
However, the Court does not interpret the expression "in accordance with
the law" as meaning that the safeguards must be enshrined in the very text
which authorises the imposition of restrictions. In fact, the question of
safeguards against abuse is closely linked with the question of effective
remedies and the Court finds it preferable to take this issue into account in
the wider context of Article 13 (art. 13) (see paragraphs 111-119 below).
2. Application in the present case of the above-mentioned principles
(a) Non-contested items
91. The Commission expressed the opinion that the stopping on the
following principal or subsidiary grounds of the following letters was not
foreseeable and, hence, was not "in accordance with the law":
(a) restriction on correspondence with legal adviser, on the ground that
the applicant had already had sufficient facilities to seek legal advice (see
paragraphs 32 and 60 above): Mr. Cooper’s letter no. 27;
(b) prohibition on representations connected with the prisoner’s trial,
conviction or sentence (see paragraphs 43 and 61 above): Mr. Noe’s letter
no. 8 and Mr. McMahon’s letters nos. 35 and 37;
(c) prohibition of grossly improper language (see paragraphs 45 (a), item
(vi), and 65 above): Mr. Cooper’s letters nos. 28-31;