Surveillance by intelligence services – Volume II: field perspectives and legal update
Securing sufficient powers and competence for the
oversight system, however, may still fall short of securing
an overall adequate oversight system, if the bodies
involved do not have sufficient human, financial and
technical resources to fulfil their functions appropriately.
Review of resources
“The adequacy of such resources should be kept under
review and consideration should be given as to whether
increases in security service budgets necessitate parallel
increases in overseers’ budgets.”
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2015), p. 14.
As the resource needs of oversight bodies may differ
substantially according to their functions and their role
within a state’s oversight system, general standards for
sufficient resources cannot be established. Therefore,
they should be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the standard of sufficient powers.
The oversight bodies contribute to the framing of
the intelligence services’ work as well as the specific
control of the surveillance measures. DPAs can play
an important but specific role in this area depending
on their competences.
Parliamentary committees focus their review on the
overall legality of the functioning of the services
and the intelligence policy, and not of that of their
specific operations. In the Netherlands, for example,
the Parliamentary Commission for the Intelligence and
Security Services (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdiensten, CIVD) is responsible for overseeing
the services to the extent that matters remain classified
and is regularly informed about the operational activities
of the General Intelligence and Security Service. 283
The French parliamentary intelligence delegation
(DPR) examines and assesses governmental policy on
intelligence; it does not oversee the services directly.
This is to preserve the separation of powers.284 It may
conduct hearings and request strategic intelligence
reports from the executive.285 The DPR does not carry
out thematic investigations. In its 2017 report, the
DPR suggested that two audits be conducted by the
Inspectorate of Intelligence Services, one on recruiting
intelligence service staff and one on intelligence files.286
283 The Netherlands, House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer
der Staten Generaal) (2016), ‘Verslag van de commissie
voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten over haar
werkzaamheden in 2015’, available at: https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34505-1.html
284 France, DPR & CNCTR (2017), p. 9
285 France, Adam, P., Parliamentary Delegation on
Intelligence (2017), p. 12.
286 Ibid. p. 57 and following.
76
The different parliamentary committees of Member
States have various mandates and powers. These
include overseeing the policies, administration, budget
and expenditure of the intelligence services; receiving
periodical reports from the services themselves or
from the members of the executive that oversee
them; and inspecting sensitive documents and
records and the premises of the intelligence services.
Some may also receive complaints from individuals.
The 2015 FRA report described the powers and
competences of several specialised and non-specialised
parliamentary committees in charge of the oversight
of intelligence services.287
“The [United Kingdom’s Parliamentary] Committee has been
supported in its work by a team of seven core staff and
seven Detainee Inquiry staff. These staff have an immensely
difficult job to do. They act independently in support of
the Committee and this is not always easy or popular with
those who do not understand the importance of robust
independent oversight.”
Statement by Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee (2017)
Ad-hoc inquiry commissions or other general
commissions can also play an important role in
overseeing the services’ work. In Belgium, the
temporary ‘Fight against Terrorism’ Commission was
established after the Paris attacks of November 2015.
Its task was to examine the bills implementing certain
measures put forward by the government following
the terrorist attacks in Paris. 288 A Parliamentary
Investigative Commission was also set up to examine
the circumstances that led to the March 2016
attacks in Brussels.289
287 FRA (2015a), pp. 34 and following.
288 Belgium, House of Representatives (2016), ‘Magazine La
chambre’, LaChambre.be, p. 3; House of Representatives,
Text adopted by the temporary ‘Fight against Terrorism’
Commission – Bill concerning complementary measures
related to the fight against terrorism (Projet de loi relatif
à des mesures complémentaires en matière de lutte contre
le terrorisme/Wetsontwerp inzake aanvullende maatregelen
ter bestrijding van terrorisme), 14 April 2016.
289 Belgium, Proposition visant à instituer une commission
d’enquête parlementaire chargée d’examiner les
circonstances qui ont conduit aux attentats terroristes
du 22 mars 2016 dans l’aéroport de Bruxelles-National et
dans la station de métro Maelbeek à Bruxelles, y compris
l’évolution et la gestion de la lutte contre le radicalisme et la
menace terroriste, 11 April 2016.