13) The data provided does not contain communication content or
Subscriber Information (information held or obtained by a [PECN]
about persons to whom the [PECN] provides or has provided
communication services). The data provided is therefore anonymous.
It is also data which is in any event maintained and retained by
[PECN's] for their own commercial purposes (particularly billing and
fraud prevention).
14) Such data is of significant intelligence and security value."
11
In the recent Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner ("I C
C"), Sir Stanley Burnton, being a Review of directions given under s.94 dated
July 2016 (“the July Review”), the I C C stated at paragraph 8.34 that:
"All of the current directions require regular feeds of bulk
communications data to be disclosed by the relevant PECN."
12
The MI5 witness explained at paragraph 25 of his statement:"The use of communications data (the who, where, when and how of a
communication but not its content) is a vital tool in the investigation of
threats and safeguarding the public. The DG for MI5 discussed the
importance of communications data in meeting the challenges that the
SIA's face in his BBC interview of 17th September 2015:"We need to be able to use datasets so we can join the dots, to be able
to find and stop the terrorists who mean us harm before they are able
to bring the plots to fruition. We have been pretty successful at that in
recent years but it is becoming more difficult to do that as technology
changes faster and faster."”
Avowal
13
‘Avowal’ has become something of a term of art in the course of proceedings
before this Tribunal, namely being the date when the Respondents have
publicly avowed the activity the subject of consideration in the relevant
proceedings. In this case the existence of BPD was only avowed in
March 2015, when disclosure was made to the ISC. By a Direction dated
11th March 2015 (the Intelligence Services Commissioner Additional
Review Functions) (Bulk Personal Datasets) Direction 2015) the Prime
Minister, pursuant to his power under s.59(a) of RIPA, directed the
Intelligence Services Commissioner (“I S Commissioner”) to, "continue to
keep under review the acquisition, use, retention and disclosure by the [SIAs]
of bulk personal datasets, as well as the adequacy of safeguards against
misuse," and to "assure himself that the acquisition, use, retention and
disclosure of bulk personal datasets does not occur except in accordance
with," the relevant sections of the SSA 1989 and ISA 1994, and to "seek to
8