(viii) BCD contains large amounts of data, most of which relates to individuals
who are unlikely to be of any intelligence interest.
(ix) BCD may be disclosed to persons outside the agency holding the BCD
(subject to safeguards contained in the relevant Handling Arrangements).
(x) Prior to the publication of the Investigatory Powers Bill, the use of s.94 to
collect BCD was not publicly acknowledged.
(xi) There have been instances of non-compliance with internal procedures and
safeguards in relation to access of BCD databases at GCHQ and MI5, revealed
in the various Commissioners’ Reports.
(b) BPD
(i) GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 collect and hold BPDs, on their respective analytical
systems .
(ii) BPDs consist of large amounts of personal data: the majority of
individuals whose personal data is contained in a BPD will be of no
intelligence interest.
(iii) Multiple BPDs are analysed together to obtain search results.
(iv) BPD may be acquired through overt and covert channels.
(v) BPD can contain sensitive personal data as defined under s.2 of the Data
Protection Act 1998 and/or information covered by legal professional
privilege, journalistic material and financial data.
(vi) GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 share BPDs, and BPDs may be shared with their
foreign partners and/or may be disclosed to persons outside the agencies, as
described in their Handling Arrangements.
(vii) MI5, GCHQ and MI6 each acquire BPDs from other Government
departments.
(viii) GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 do not currently hold and have never held a BPD
of medical records, although medical data may appear in BPDs.
(ix) There have been instances of non compliance with BPD safeguards at
GCHQ, MI5 and MI6, as disclosed in the various Commissioners' Reports.
(x) There was no statutory oversight of BPD's by the I S Commissioner prior
to the March 2015 ISC Report.
(xi) Prior to the publication of that ISC Report, the holding of BPDs was not
publicly acknowledged.
20
Since the proceedings commenced, as referred to above, there is now before
Parliament a Bill. Although the Claimant has referred to some parts of the Bill
as examples of improvements which the Claimant asserts can and should be
made to the present arrangements, or as indicating that the present
arrangements are not satisfactory or compliant with Article 8, the Bill itself,
and of course Parliament's consideration of it, will for obvious reasons not
form part of our consideration.
21
It is important to emphasise that the Tribunal and the parties recognise that
there is a serious threat to public safety, particularly from international
terrorism, and that the SIAs are dedicated to discharging their responsibility to
protect the public. It is understandable in the circumstances that the
Respondents, both through Mr. Eadie orally and by their evidence, have
emphasised the important part which the use of BCD and BPD have played in
furthering that protection, particularly where those who pose the threat are
11