MR JUSTICE BURTON
Approved Judgment
there should be as much transparency as is consistent with the protection of national
security, and welcome the Respondents’ statement recorded at paragraph 5 of the
Disclosure: we encourage the Respondents to continue to see whether more
disclosures can be made even in areas where we have reached no such conclusion.
A SUMMARY
156.
In the course of this judgment we have made detailed reference to the various
statutory and other safeguards and oversights which govern the receipt of
intercepted material in the United Kingdom. Save in one possible (and to date
hypothetical) respect, (see paragraph 53 above), we have ruled that the current
regime, both in relation to Prism and Upstream and to s.8(4), when conducted in
accordance with the requirements which we have considered, is lawful and human
rights compliant; but having regard to the submissions we have received, which
amount to a comprehensive critique of the interception regime, we think it right in
the public interest to describe the essence of what the law provides by way of
human rights protection.
157.
The legislation in force and the safeguards to which we have referred are intended
to recognise the importance of, and the need to maintain, an acceptable balance
between (a) the interests of the State to acquire information for the vital purposes of
national security and the protection of its citizens from terrorism and other serious
crime, and (b) the vital interests of all citizens to know that the law makes effective
provision to safeguard their rights to privacy and freedom of expression, together
with appropriate and effective limits upon what the State does with that information.
158.
Technology in the surveillance field appears to be advancing at break-neck speed.
This has given rise to submissions that the UK legislation has failed to keep abreast
of the consequences of these advances, and is ill fitted to do so; and that in any
event Parliament has failed to provide safeguards adequate to meet these
developments. All this inevitably creates considerable tension between the
competing interests, and the ‘Snowden revelations’ in particular have led to the
impression voiced in some quarters that the law in some way permits the
Intelligence Services carte blanche to do what they will. We are satisfied that this is
not the case.
159.
We can be satisfied that, as addressed and disclosed in this judgment, in this
sensitive field of national security, in relation to the areas addressed in this case, the
law gives individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and
the conditions upon which the Intelligence Services are entitled to resort to
interception, or to make use of intercept.
160.
We wish to emphasise that whatever the circumstances of the receipt by the
Intelligence Services of intercepted material, the following matters of law are of
paramount importance:
(i)
In relation to any material intercepted abroad it would always be unlawful
for the Intelligence Services to use the absence of a warrant as a device
deliberately to circumvent the requirements of UK law by procuring
another State to do what they could not lawfully do themselves.