MR JUSTICE BURTON
Approved Judgment
121.
This is in our judgment not only consistent with the decisions of the ECtHR to
which we have referred, but, although, as is clear from paragraph 67 of Liberty v
UK, oversight (by the Commissioner) was not enough of itself, it is coupled with
the approval by the Court of the oversight arrangements in place in respect of RIPA.
In addition to this Tribunal, there is also the ISC, to which the Court in Kennedy
did not expressly refer, and which, notwithstanding Ms Brimelow’s critique is, we
are satisfied, robustly independent, and now additionally fortified by the provisions
of the JSA which were, according to their Report, referred to in paragraph 6 above,
broadly in line with the changes which they themselves had previously
recommended to the Government. As for the Commissioner, of particular relevance
is his duty under s.57(1)(d) of RIPA to keep under review the adequacy of the
arrangements by virtue of which the duty imposed on the Secretary of State by s.15
are sought to be discharged, and, by reference to s.58(3), his duty if it at any time
appears to him “that any arrangements by reference to which the duties imposed by
s. . . 15 . . have [been] sought to be discharged are proved inadequate in relation to
any matter with which the Commissioner is concerned, to make a report to the
Prime Minister with respect to those arrangements.”
122.
We remain of the same view as this Tribunal in British Irish Rights Watch (at
paragraphs 36 and 37) that it is not necessary that the precise details of all the
safeguards should be published, or contained in legislation, delegated or otherwise.
123.
Against that background, we consider Weber 3, 4, 5 and 6. We have set out the
relevant sections of RIPA in paragraphs 63-67 and 74 above, and set out and
referred to the relevant parts of Chapters 5 and 6 of the Code in paragraphs 69 and
75 above. The Court considered and approved these provisions at paragraphs 161
and 163 to 165 of its judgment in Kennedy, as follows:
“161. In respect of the duration of any telephone tapping, the
Act clearly stipulates, first, the period after which an
interception warrant will expire and, second, the conditions
under which a warrant can be renewed. Although a warrant
can be renewed indefinitely, the Secretary of State himself must
authorise any renewal and, upon such authorisation, must
again satisfy himself that the warrant remains necessary on the
grounds stipulated in section 5(3). In the context of national
security and serious crime, the Court observes that the scale of
the criminal activities involved is such that their planning often
takes some time. Subsequent investigations may also be of some
duration, in light of the general complexity of such cases and
the numbers of individuals involved. The Court is therefore of
the view that the overall duration of any interception measures
will depend on the complexity and duration of the investigation
in question and, provided that adequate safeguards exist, it is
not unreasonable to leave this matter for the discretion of the
relevant domestic authorities. The Code explains that the
person seeking the renewal must make an application to the
Secretary of State providing an update and assessing the value
of the interception operation to date. He must specifically
address why he considers that the warrant remains necessary