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A Democratic Licence to Operate
operational efficiency, appropriately qualified judges would have to be available at all
times throughout the year.
The Transparency of the Oversight Regime
5.61
The Panel welcome the positive changes in approach of the SIAs during the time that
we have been conducting this Review, and that more information is in the public domain
on the checks and balances that exist within each of them. The Panel hope this process
will continue, and that further thought will be given in particular to the need to keep the
public informed. We do not believe there is a reason why GCHQ’s Ethical Framework or
Policy on Whistleblowing could not be made public, for example.
5.62
While the existence of checks and balances within the system is positive, these have not
been sufficiently shared with the wider public. There are significant improvements to
be made to the external mechanisms in place to oversee the activities of the agencies
and hold them to account. It is important not only that oversight is carried out, but that
it is seen to be done effectively by the general public. While the SIAs have taken recent
positive steps to enhance public confidence, overall public recognition and understanding
of mechanisms such as the IPT and commissioners is currently poor.
5.63
While the IPT serves an important function, the Panel note that the Tribunal has
been seen as opaque and inaccessible to the wider public. Not all hearings or, more
importantly, rulings are made public (though we accept there may be good reason for
hearings to be confidential in some circumstances). The only avenue of appeal to a ruling
by the IPT is via the European Court of Human Rights.
5.64
The commissioners do not have a significant public profile. Despite providing substantial
oversight of warrants and the activities of the agencies, the work of the commissioners
does not currently translate into greater levels of public understanding. Their annual
reports place a great deal of information in the public domain on the work of the
agencies and their compliance with legal regulations, but these are not widely read or
publicly debated.
5.65
There is a lack of understanding (even internally) of the division of roles and responsibilities
between each commissioner. The confusing cartography of commissioners, a
consequence of their roles developing in a piecemeal manner, does little to reassure the
public of the rigorous oversight of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. Many of
their responsibilities are currently carried out on a non-statutory basis.
5.66
The offices of some of the commissioners are very proficient (especially IOCCO). It is
important to ensure that all commissioners are supported by sufficient resources to
ensure the breadth and depth of investigations. These resources should comprise a
breadth of expertise (to be able to consider broad, thematic issues), a depth of knowledge
in certain areas (including technical knowledge of coding and algorithms to inspect