Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
101
government is to protect its citizens, then there is some part of government in the open
society that must nevertheless constitute the secret parts of the state. These parts of the
state cover the intelligence services and many of the investigative functions of the police
and other law-enforcement agencies. Their necessary secrecy and the considerable
power they have to intrude into the lives of citizens means that the secret elements of
the state must be regarded as special, but subject to even more special constraints.
5.20
Much of the work of the secret parts of the state has to be handled with the utmost
confidentiality or it simply fails to be effective. The vast majority of the information
political leaders may need in the normal course of their policy-making is provided by
open sources. But when they need to draw on secret information, nothing else will
do. The concepts of transparency and accountability are often misunderstood in these
discussions. It is unrealistic for the intelligence agencies and some specialist parts of
the police service to operate in very transparent ways. They could not be effective if
they did. They should, however, be rigorously and independently held accountable, and
the oversight mechanisms must themselves be highly transparent to the public. This
is an investment in public trust, without which the secret parts of the state cannot be
effective or even legitimately exist.
5.21
It is therefore understood that those special surveillance techniques and human skills
of the intelligence agencies are only used to tackle the most difficult informationbased tasks in the business of national security. Similar skills are required for the
most demanding police tasks. The Panel recognise the importance of maintaining and
updating these capacities in the face of rapid technological change. But these skills and
techniques must be carefully constrained and should not be allowed to seep into other
areas of government where their use is neither necessary nor appropriate. Care must be
taken to ensure these skills are used in the public interest and not private or institutional
interests. Additionally, secrecy must not be used as a means to avoid accountability or
hide mistakes.
5.22
The Panel understand that advances in digital technologies have brought new challenges
and pressures, particularly for law enforcement and national security. Technology
enhances the lives of the vast majority of those using it, but the same capabilities are
used by criminals and adversaries. Internet-based technologies are a powerful force
multiplier both for good and bad; in particular, they increase the influence of non-state
groups and organisations – as opposed to governments – on the lives of individuals.
The digital society promises new expressions of individual freedom and democratic
engagement. But the corresponding advantage for malign groups and individuals is a
phenomenon to which modern Western governments are still trying to adjust.
5.23
This challenge to adjust is not only created by technological ‘flattening’ – the growing
power of technologies widely available to individuals and private groups – but by the
inherently global nature of internet-based technology. The Internet naturally crosses
jurisdictional boundaries, but the agencies of government are, by definition, jurisdictional