Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
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other aspect of security and intelligence agency business.41 In March 2015, the InSeC
accepted an additional review function at the request of the prime minister to ‘keep
under review the acquisition, use, retention and disclosure [by the intelligence agencies]
of bulk personal data sets, as well as the adequacy of safeguards against misuse’.42
4.63
Directed surveillance – such as a camera operated by MI5 and targeted at a specific person
– would be an issue for the InSeC on the basis that it concerns surveillance by a security
and intelligence agency directed at specific individuals. Whatever the actual technology
used, intrusive methods are under the supervision of the commissioner. Authorisation
for such directed surveillance would be done by a senior figure at the relevant agency
who is outside of the operational chain of command for the investigation.
4.64
In 2013, 1,887 warrants and authorisations were approved across the intelligence
services and the Ministry of Defence. The InSeC scrutinised 318 extant warrants and
their supporting paperwork, representing 16.8 per cent of the total. The total number
of new warrants and authorisations for 2013 was a reduction on 2012 (2,838). However,
the statistics in the 2012 report have been described as misleading, as a number of
authorisations were cancelled and then re-authorised as a result of their migration onto
a new electronic system.43
The Office of Surveillance Commissioners
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The statutory responsibility of the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) is to
oversee the use of covert surveillance (property interference, intrusive surveillance and
directed surveillance) and CHIS by all designated public authorities, with the exception
of the SIAs (since this duty is carried out by InSeC). The OSC also has responsibility for
overseeing RIPA 2000 Part III on access to protected data. Since January 2014, the OSC
has looked at the use and authorisation of undercover operatives; the OSC will now
grant (or deny) approval for any CHIS that has been deployed for longer than one year.
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The OSC has a team of seven surveillance inspectors that undertakes annual inspections
of all the law-enforcement agencies and triennial review of all other public authorities,
local authorities and government departments.
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The OSC does not believe that there is a level playing field across the oversight regime,
in terms of the level of scrutiny in place for law enforcement on the one hand and the
SIAs on the other. The OSC scrutinises all covert policing departments for up to a week
and speaks to a vast array of individuals – from police constables to chief constables,
through to heads of agency, and so on. The OSC also scrutinises activity on the front line
41. See legislation.gov.uk, ‘Justice and Security Act 2013, Explanatory Notes’, < http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/notes>.
42. See the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Intelligence Services Commissioner
(Additional Review Functions) (Bulk Personal Datasets) Direction 2015.
43. Walker, Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2013, p. 35.