Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
85
volumes where the sender and/or recipient are located overseas. The ‘vast majority’ of
interception warrants do not run for more than six months. A sample of 936 warrants
was specifically examined, amounting to 58 per cent of the number of extant warrants
(34 per cent of the total of new warrants issued in 2014). Sixty-eight per cent of warrants
were issued under the statutory purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, 31
per cent were issued for national-security purposes and 1 per cent issued under both.
4.55
In 2014, 517,236 authorisations and notices under Chapter II, Part I of RIPA 2000 were
made (excluding urgent oral applications). This was a slight increase on 2013 (514,608)
but still significantly less that the 2012 figure (570,135). 88.9 per cent of authorisations
and notices were made by the police and law-enforcement agencies, compared to 9.8 per
cent by the intelligence agencies and 1.3 per cent for local and other public authorities.
4.56
Sixty interception errors were reported to IOCCO in 2014, with full details of all errors
reported by both the interception agencies in question and the CSPs. Most related to
safeguard breaches relating to RIPA 2000 Section 15/16, a failure to cancel interception,
or interception of the incorrect communications address.
4.57
The majority of the commissioner’s recommendations in the 2014 annual report fall
into three key categories: the warrant application process, Section 15/16 safeguards,
and the issue and implementation of warrants. Eleven specific recommendations were
made to the interception agencies to ‘review or shorten their retention periods and/
or destroy interception material and/or related communications data where there was
no persuasive justification provided for its on-going retention’. All recommendations
were accepted and the large majority had already been implemented at the time of the
report’s publication, causing ‘a significant amount of intercepted material and related
communications data to be destroyed’.37
The Intelligence Services Commissioner
4.58
The primary role of the Intelligence Services Commissioner (InSeC) is to provide
independent external oversight of the use of intrusive powers, interference with
property, and investigation of electronic data protected by encryption by the intelligence
agencies and parts of the Ministry of Defence. InSeC is also charged with keeping the
following under review:
•
•
The exercise by the secretaries of state of their powers to issue warrants and
authorisations to enable the intelligence services to carry out their functions
The exercise and performance of the powers and duties imposed on the intelligence
services and Ministry of Defence and armed-forces personnel in relation to
covert activities which are the subject of an internal authorisation procedure
37. May, Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner: March 2015, p. 33.