Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
81
surveillance powers and a further restriction on the number of public bodies able to
request communications data.24
4.38
DRIPA 2014 had cross-party support and the Bill was fast-tracked through Parliament
in less than seven days (a process that normally takes several months). This attracted
criticisms from some MPs and civil-liberties groups, who claimed that there had been
insufficient time to scrutinise and debate the implications of the legislation.
4.39
Critics also accused the government of trying to slyly re-introduce expanded capabilities
contained in the Communications Data Bill which was previously blocked by Liberal
Democrat opposition in 2012. This was, opponents argued, an attempt to expand the
interception capabilities of the government in general and the SIAs in particular: ‘In
extending the territorial reach of the RIPA interception regime, the Government seeks to
dramatically expand its ability to mandate the interception of communications content
across the globe’.25
4.40
A group of fifteen technology-law academics wrote an open letter in which they claimed
that DRIPA was ‘far more than an administrative necessity; it is a serious expansion of the
British surveillance state. We urge the British Government not to fast track this legislation
and instead apply full and proper parliamentary scrutiny to ensure Parliamentarians
are not mislead [sic] as to what powers this Bill truly contains’.26 The government has
committed to a review of the legislation governing surveillance by December 2016
when DRIPA expires; this ISR Report is intended to contribute to the debate leading up
to this review.
The Oversight Regime
4.41
Robust and effective oversight and redress is ‘an essential component in inspiring and
maintaining public trust and confidence’.27 As identified by the previous section, there are
provisions within a number of pieces of legislation for scrutiny and oversight of the UK’s
intelligence, security and law-enforcement agencies. RIPA 2000 strengthened existing
legislation under the ISA 1994 and the SSA 1989 to set out the legislative framework for
the commissioners, Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Codes of Practice.
4.42
Whilst greater oversight of intrusive activity is welcome, ‘this proliferation of oversight
mechanisms and regulators with, in some cases, overlapping responsibilities does means
24. Ward and Horne, ‘Interception of Communications’, p. 1.
25. Liberty et al., ‘Liberty, Privacy International, Open Rights Group, Big Brother Watch, Article
19 and English PEN Briefing’, p. 3.
26. Jemima Kiss, ‘Academics: UK “Drip” Data Law Changes Are “Serious Expansion of
Surveillance”’, Guardian, 15 July 2014.
27. Information Commissioner’s Office submission to the ISR.