BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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focussed on those of particular interest or sensitivity (such as those which
gave rise to an unusual degree of collateral intrusion, those which have been
extant for a considerable period, those which were approved orally, those
which resulted in the interception of legal or otherwise confidential
communications, and so-called ‘thematic’ warrants). Secondly, inspectors
scrutinised the selected warrants and associated documentation in detail
during reading days which preceded the inspections. Thirdly, they identified
those warrants, operations or areas of the process which required further
information or clarification and arranged to interview relevant operational,
legal or technical staff. Where necessary, they examined further
documentation or systems relating to those warrants.
185. 970 warrants were examined during the twenty-two interception
inspections (sixty-one percent of the number of warrants in force at the end
of the year and thirty-two percent of the total of new warrants issued in
2016).
186. According to the report, every interception agency had a different
view on what constituted an appropriate retention period for intercepted
material and related communications data. There was no period prescribed
by the legislation, but the agencies had to consider section 15(3) of RIPA,
which provided that the material or data had to be destroyed as soon as
retaining it was no longer necessary for any of the authorised purposes in
section 15(4). The vast majority of content was reviewed and automatically
deleted after a very short period of time unless specific action was taken to
retain the content for longer because it was necessary to do so. The retention
periods differed within the interception agencies and ranged between thirty
days and one year. The retention periods for related communications data
also differed within the interception agencies, but ranged between six
months and one year.
187. Inspectors made a total of twenty-eight recommendations in their
inspection reports, eighteen of which were made in relation to the
application process. The majority of the recommendations in this category
related to the necessity, proportionality and/or collateral intrusion
justifications in the applications; or the handling of legally privileged or
otherwise confidential material relating to sensitive professions.
188. The total number of interception errors reported to the
Commissioner during 2016 was 108. Key causes of interception errors were
over-collection (generally technical software or hardware errors that caused
over-collection of intercepted material and related communications data),
unauthorised selection/examination, incorrect dissemination, the failure to
cancel interception, and the interception of either an incorrect
communications address or person.