76
BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
oversight of investigatory powers. The IPCO consists of around fifteen
Judicial Commissioners, current and recently retired High Court, Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court Judges; a Technical Advisory Panel made up of
scientific experts; and almost fifty official staff, including inspectors,
lawyers and communications experts. The more intrusive powers such as
interception, equipment interference and the use of surveillance in sensitive
environments will be subject to the prior approval of a Judicial
Commissioner once the provisions of the 2016 Act have entered into force.
Use of these and other surveillance powers, including the acquisition of
communications data and the use of covert human intelligence sources, are
also overseen by a programme of retrospective inspection and audit by
Judicial Commissioners and IPCO’s inspectors.
F. Reviews of interception operations by the intelligence service
1. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: July 2013
Statement on GCHQ’s alleged interception of communications
under the US PRISM programme
148. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (“the ISC”)
was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine
the policy, administration and expenditure of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ. Since
the introduction of the Justice and Security Act 2013, however, the ISC was
expressly given the status of a Committee of Parliament; was provided with
greater powers; and its remit was increased to include inter alia oversight of
operational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of
Government. Pursuant to sections 1-4 of the Justice and Security Act 2013,
it consists of nine members drawn from both Houses of Parliament, and, in
the exercise of their functions, those members are routinely given access to
highly classified material in carrying out their duties.
149. Following the Edward Snowden revelations, the ISC conducted an
investigation into GCHQ’s access to the content of communications
intercepted under the US PRISM programme, the legal framework
governing access, and the arrangements GCHQ had with its overseas
counterpart for sharing information. In the course of the investigation, the
ISC took detailed evidence from GCHQ and discussed the programme with
the NSA.
150. The ISC concluded that allegations that GCHQ had circumvented
United Kingdom law by using the NSA PRISM programme to access the
content of private communications were unfounded as GCHQ had complied
with its statutory duties contained in the ISA. It further found that in each
case where GCHQ sought information from the United States, a warrant for
interception, signed by a Government Minister, had already been in place.
However, it found it necessary to further consider whether the current