BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT

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communications addresses of persons suspected to be acting as
intermediaries between the journalist and the suspected source.

3.80. Each authority must keep a central record of all occasions when such an
application has been made, including a record of the considerations.
3.81. This includes that, where the police suspect wrong‑doing that includes
communications with a journalist, the application must consider properly whether that
conduct is criminal and of a sufficiently serious nature for rights to freedom of
expression to be interfered with where communications data is to be acquired for the
purpose of identifying a journalist’s source.
3.82. As described in paragraph 3.29 above, the SPoC should be engaged in this
process, to ensure appropriate engagement with the CSPs.
3.83. If and only if there is a believed to be an immediate threat of loss of human
life, such that a person’s life might be endangered by the delay inherent in the process
of judicial authorisation, law enforcement agencies may continue to use the existing
internal authorisation process under RIPA. Such applications must be flagged to the
Interception of Communications Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable, as
agreed with the Commissioner. If additional communications data is later sought as
part of the same investigation, but where a threat to life no longer exists, judicial
authorisation must be sought.
3.84. The requirement for judicial oversight does not apply where applications are
made for the communications data of those known to be journalists but where the
application is not to determine the source of journalistic information. This includes,
for example, where the journalist is a victim of crime or is suspected of committing a
crime unrelated to their occupation.
Local authority authorisation procedure
3.85. Local authorities must fulfil two additional requirements when acquiring
communications data that differ from other public authorities. Firstly, the request must
be made through a SPoC at the National Anti‑Fraud Network (‘NAFN’). Secondly,
the request must receive prior judicial approval.
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6 KEEPING OF RECORDS
Records to be kept by a relevant public authority
6.1. Applications, authorisations, copies of notices, and records of the withdrawal
of authorisations and the cancellation of notices, must be retained by the relevant
public authority in written or electronic form, and physically attached or
cross‑referenced where they are associated with each other. The public authority
should also keep a record of the date and, when appropriate to do so, the time when
each notice or authorisation is given or granted, renewed or cancelled. Records kept
by the public authority must be held centrally by the SPoC or in accordance with
arrangements previously agreed with the Commissioner.
6.2. These records must be available for inspection by the Commissioner and
retained to allow the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, established under Part IV of
RIPA, to carry out its functions.
6.3. Where the records contain, or relate to, material obtained directly as a
consequence of the execution of an interception warrant, those records must be treated

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