BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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10.2. The Commissioner carries out biannual inspections of each of the nine
interception agencies. The primary objectives of the inspections are to ensure that the
Commissioner has the information he or she requires to carry out his or her functions
under section 57 of RIPA and produce his or her report under section 58 of RIPA.
This may include inspection or consideration of:
The systems in place for the interception of communications;
The relevant records kept by the intercepting agency;
The lawfulness of the interception carried out; and
Any errors and the systems designed to prevent such errors.
10.3. Any person who exercises the powers in RIPA Part I Chapter I must report to
the Commissioner any action that is believed to be contrary to the provisions of RIPA
or any inadequate discharge of section 15 safeguards. He or she must also comply
with any request made by the Commissioner to provide any such information as the
Commissioner requires for the purpose of enabling him or her to discharge his or her
functions.”
5. Statement of Charles Farr
91. In his witness statement prepared for the Liberty proceedings,
Charles Farr indicated that, beyond the details set out in RIPA, the 2010
Code, and the draft 2016 Code (which had at that stage been published for
consultation), the full details of the sections 15 and 16 safeguards were kept
confidential. He had personally reviewed the arrangements and was satisfied
that they could not safely be put in the public domain without undermining
the effectiveness of the interception methods. However, the arrangements
were made available to the Commissioner who is required by RIPA to keep
them under review. Furthermore, each intercepting agency was required to
keep a record of the arrangements in question and any breach must be
reported to the Commissioner.
6. Belhadj and Others v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service,
Government Communications Headquarters, the Secretary of State
for the Home Department, and the Secretary of State for the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, IPT/13/132-9/H and IPT/14/86/CH
92. The applicants in this case complained of breaches of Articles 6, 8
and 14 of the Convention arising from the alleged interception of their
legally privileged communications. Insofar as Amnesty International, in the
course of the Liberty proceedings, complained about the adequacy of the
arrangements for the protection of material protected by legal professional
privilege (“LPP”), those complaints were “hived off” to be dealt with in this
case, and Amnesty International was joined as a claimant (see paragraph 47
above).
93. In the course of the proceedings, the respondents conceded that by
virtue of there not being in place a lawful system for dealing with LPP, from
January 2010 the regime for the interception/obtaining, analysis, use,