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BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
Court considered that the latter, even if unproductive, constituted a more
drastic measure than an order to divulge the source’s identity, since
investigators who raid a journalist’s workplace have access to all the
documentation held by the journalist (Roemen and Schmit, cited above,
§ 57). However, the Court has also drawn a distinction between searches
carried out on journalists’ homes and workplaces “with a view to
uncovering their sources”, and searches carried out for other reasons, such
as the obtaining of evidence of an offence committed by a person other than
in his or her capacity as a journalist (Roemen and Schmit, cited above, § 52).
Similarly, in Weber and Saravia, the only case in which the Court has
considered, in abstracto, the Article 10 compliance of a secret surveillance
regime on account of the potential for interference with confidential
journalistic material, it considered it decisive that the surveillance measures
were not aimed at monitoring journalists or uncovering journalistic sources.
As such, it found that the interference with freedom of expression could not
be characterised as particularly serious (Weber and Saravia, cited above,
§ 151).
(b) The application of the general principles to the present case
(i) The section 8(4) regime
490. With regard to the question of victim status, the Court recalls that
in Weber and Saravia it expressly recognised that the impugned
surveillance regime had interfered with the first applicant’s freedom of
expression as a journalist (Weber and Saravia, cited above, §§ 143-145). In
the present case, the applicants in the second of the joined cases are
journalists and can similarly claim to be “victims” of an interference with
their Article 10 rights by virtue of the operation of the section 8(4) regime.
491. For the reasons set out in respect of the Article 8 complaint, the
Court considers that – save for its concerns about the oversight of the
selection process and the safeguards applicable to the selection of related
communications data (see paragraph 387 above) – the section 8(4) regime
was in accordance with the law (see paragraphs 387-388 above).
Furthermore, it pursued the legitimate aims of protecting interests of
national security, territorial integrity and public safety, and preventing
disorder and crime.
492. With regard to “necessity”, the Court reiterates that, having regard
to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for the freedom of
the press in a democratic society, an interference could not be compatible
with Article 10 of the Convention unless it was justified by an overriding
requirement in the public interest (Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 149).
In this regard, it notes that the surveillance measures under the section 8(4)
regime – like those under the G10 Act which were considered in Weber and
Saravia – are not aimed at monitoring journalists or uncovering journalistic