BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
165
range of Convention Articles – the very real threat that Contracting States
currently face on account of international terrorism (see, for example,
Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 79, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 3455/05, § 181, ECHR 2009; A. v. the Netherlands, no. 4900/06,
§ 143, 20 July 2010; Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140/10, § 117, ECHR 2014
(extracts); and Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, no. 8139/09,
§ 183, ECHR 2012).
446. Faced with such a threat, the Court has considered it legitimate for
Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to
terrorist acts (see Othman, cited above, § 183). Due to the nature of global
terrorism, and in particular the complexity of global terror networks, the
Court accepts that taking such a stand – and thus preventing the perpetration
of violent acts endangering the lives of innocent people – requires a flow of
information between the security services of many countries in all parts of
the world. As, in the present case, this “information flow” was embedded
into a legislative context providing considerable safeguards against abuse,
the Court would accept that the resulting interference was kept to that which
was “necessary in a democratic society”.
(θ) Conclusions
447. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the
domestic law, together with the clarifications brought by the amendment of
the IC Code, indicate with sufficient clarity the procedure for requesting
either interception or the conveyance of intercept material from foreign
intelligence agencies. In this regard, it observes that the high threshold
recommended by the Venice Commission – namely, that the material
transferred should only be able to be searched if all the material
requirements of a national search were fulfilled and this was duly authorised
in the same way as a search of bulk material obtained by the signals
intelligence agency using its own techniques – is met by the respondent
State’s regime. The Court further observes that there is no evidence of any
significant shortcomings in the application and operation of the regime. On
the contrary, following an investigation the ISC found no evidence
whatsoever of abuse.
448. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
(v) Application of the test to material falling into the third category
449. The third category of material identified at paragraph 417 above is
material obtained by foreign intelligence agencies other than by the
interception of communications. However, as the applicants have not
specified the kind of material foreign intelligence agencies might obtain by
methods other than interception they have not demonstrated that its