162
BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. A
member of the intelligence services commits an offence under section 1(1)
of the OSA (see paragraph 107 above) if he discloses, without lawful
authority, any information relating to security or intelligence which is, or
has been, in his possession by virtue of his position.
432. More specifically, Chapter 12 of the IC Code makes it clear that
where intercepted communications content or communications data are
obtained by the intelligence services from a foreign government in
circumstances where the material identifies itself as the product of an
interception, the communications content and communications data must be
subject to the same internal rules and safeguards that apply to the same
categories of content or data when they are obtained directly by the
intelligence services as a result of interception under RIPA (see
paragraph 109 above). This means that the safeguards in section 15 and 16
of RIPA, as supplemented by Chapter 7 of the IC Code, apply equally to
intercepted communications and communications data obtained from
foreign governments.
433. The Court has already given careful consideration to the safeguards
in section 15 and 16 of RIPA, as supplemented by Chapter 7 of the IC Code,
in its assessment of the section 8(4) regime (see paragraphs 361-363 above).
In brief, material obtained from foreign intelligence agencies must be stored
securely and must not be accessible to persons without the required level of
security clearance. Access by the analyst is limited to a defined period of
time, and if renewed, the record must be updated giving reasons for
renewal. Before being able to examine material obtained from foreign
intelligence agencies, specially authorised and vetted analysts must make a
record of why access to the material is necessary for one of the statutory
purposes set out in section 5(3) of RIPA, and proportionate. They cannot
select material for examination using criteria that refer to the
communications of individuals known currently to be in the British Islands
(unless there is a warrant with a section 16(3) modification, or if, in the
absence of a warrant, the Secretary of State has personally considered and
approved the examination of those communications by reference to such
factors).
434. Although the IPT had, in the Liberty proceedings, expressed
concern that the section 16(2)(a) and (b) safeguards (which prevent
intercepted material being selected for examination by reference to an
individual known to be in the British Islands) did not appear to apply to
material obtained from foreign governments in the absence of a warrant, the
IC Code has since been amended to address this concern. Paragraph 12.5
now expressly provides that if a request made in the absence of a warrant is
approved by the Secretary of State other than in relation to specific
selectors, any communications obtained must not be examined by the
intelligence services according to any factors as are mentioned in