BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69; and Akdivar and Others, cited
above, § 68).
249. Where an applicant is challenging the general legal framework for
secret surveillance measures, the Court has identified the availability of an
effective domestic remedy as a relevant factor in determining whether that
applicant was a “victim” of the alleged violation, since, in the absence of
such a remedy, widespread suspicion and concern among the general public
that secret surveillance powers were being abused might be justified
(Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, § 171, ECHR 2015).
2. Application of those principles to the case at hand
250. The IPT is a specialist tribunal with sole jurisdiction to hear
allegations of wrongful interference with communications as a result of
conduct covered by RIPA (see paragraph 124 above). The Court of Appeal
has recently observed that the IPT is “a judicial body of like standing and
authority to the High Court” and that “[t]he quality of the membership of
the IPT in terms of judicial expertise and independence is very high” (see
paragraph 135 above). Its members must hold or have held high judicial
office or be a qualified lawyer of at least ten years’ standing (see
paragraph 123 above), and in the present case it was composed of two High
Court Judges (including the President), a Circuit Judge and two senior
barristers (see paragraph 24 above). It has jurisdiction to investigate any
complaint that a person’s communications have been intercepted (see
paragraph 124 above). In conducting such an investigation, the IPT will
generally proceed on the assumption that the facts asserted by the applicant
are true and then, acting upon that assumption, decide whether they would
constitute lawful or unlawful conduct. In doing so, the IPT considers both
the generic compliance of the relevant interception regime (on the basis of
assuming there to have been an interception as alleged) as well as, at a
subsequent stage, the specific question whether the individual applicant’s
rights have, in fact, been breached. Those involved in the authorisation and
execution of an intercept warrant are required to disclose to the IPT all the
documents it may require, including “below the waterline” documents
which could not be made public for reasons of national security (see
paragraph 127 above), irrespective of whether those documents support or
undermine their defence. The IPT has discretion to hold oral hearings, in
public, where possible (see paragraphs 131, 138 and 139 above) and, in
closed proceedings it may appoint Counsel to the Tribunal to make
submissions on behalf of claimants who cannot be represented (see
paragraph 142 above). When it determines a complaint the IPT has the
power to award compensation and make any other order it sees fit, including
quashing or cancelling any warrant and requiring the destruction of any
records (see paragraph 128 above). In considering the complaint brought by