criminal offence will be committed in the future, it also allows a transfer of data obtained through the surveillance of private homes and remote searches without requiring an imminent danger (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 <377, 379> on the surveillance of private homes) or a sufficiently specific impending danger (cf. BVerfGE 120, 274 <326,
328 and 329> on remote searches). This is incompatible with the requirements set
out above (cf. above, D I 2 b bb). However, insofar as other types of data are concerned this interference threshold is not objectionable. As the provision requires indications that a crime will be committed, the transfer of data is conditional on whether a
specific evidentiary basis for further investigations arises from the data. This is compatible with constitutional requirements.
d) In contrast, the overarching rule in § 14 sec. 7 BKAG does not raise effective constitutional concerns.
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aa) § 14 sec. 7 sentence 7 BKAG determines that the transfer of data is barred insofar as the person concerned has a prevailing and legitimate interest in halting the
transfer; thus, the provision leaves sufficient room for the constitutionally required ascertainment as to whether the required human rights standards are adhered to.
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bb) § 14 sec. 7 BKAG takes account of the Basic Law’s data protection requirements by setting out procedural law standards for the transfer and by requiring an ascertainment of an appropriate level of data protection in the receiving country.
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(1) The provision establishes the Federal Criminal Police Office’s responsibility for
the admissibility of the transfer of data and thus demands an examination in particular
as to whether sufficiently plausible indications result from the transferred information
itself or in the context of a transfer request according to which the transfer of data is
permissible for the respective purposes. If construed appropriately, the provision ensures both that the transfer purpose is formally communicated and that it is clearly
pointed out that the data may be used only for this indicated purpose. In this respect,
it is not objectionable that the purpose limitation is secured only by means of a reference to it, rather than by means of a formal obligation; nor is it objectionable that with
regard to the deletion period only an informational notice on the German legal situation must be provided. Generally it is sufficient that, with regard to the factual and legal situation in the receiving state, the authorities ascertain that the data protection
level is in actual fact appropriate.
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(2) § 14 sec. 7 sentences 7 to 9 BKAG stipulates such ascertainment requirements.
This provision, when interpreted in conformity with the Constitution, is compatible with
the constitutional requirements. It prohibits the transfer of data if a balancing of interests in the individual case results in the finding that legitimate interests of the person
concerned prevail and, to that end, notes that these include an appropriate level of
data protection in the receiving state. When interpreted in the light of the Constitution,
however, the adherence in the receiving state to the fundamental rights requirements
requiring appropriate data protection when handling data is not merely a factor the
authorities can discretionarily overcome on a case-by-case basis. Instead, minimum
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