2. The transfer requirements stipulated in § 14 sec. 1 sentence 1 nos. 1 and 3 and
sentence 2 BKAG are incompatible with these requirements.
342
a) Insofar as it is to be understood as constituting an own legal basis […], § 14 sec. 1
sentence 1 no. 1 BKAG does not satisfy the constitutional requirements for a change
in purpose. By generally allowing a transfer of data by the Federal Criminal Police Office for the purpose of fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon it, it lacks standards ensuring that data stemming from particularly intrusive surveillance measures may only be
transferred for purposes that conform to the criterion of a hypothetical re-collection of
data (cf. above, D I 2 b). Thus the power is not sufficiently delimited and disproportionate.
343
b) With respect to data stemming from the surveillance of private homes, § 14 sec. 1
sentence 1 no. 3 BKAG, too, is too broad and thus incompatible with constitutional requirements. According to the standards developed above, it must be ensured that
such data may only be transferred in the event of imminent danger (see above, D I 2
b bb; cf. also BVerfGE 109, 279 <377, 379>). The provision does not contain such a
limitation.
344
Yet as far as other data is concerned, the provision is not constitutionally objectionable when construed appropriately. […]
345
c) Finally, the transfer requirements set down in § 14 sec. 1 sentence 2 BKAG are
also not compatible with the requirements for a change in purpose.
346
The provision fails to sufficiently ensure that the transfer of data, following the criterion of a hypothetical re-collection of data, is limited to the protection of sufficiently
weighty legal interests (cf. above, D I 2 b). The provision generally allows a transfer of
data to prevent criminal offences of particular seriousness, without distinguishing with
respect to the respective means chosen for the collection of the data. This threshold,
however, does not justify the transfer of data stemming from particularly intrusive
measures. If the legislature, in the context of data transfers for the purpose of preventing threats – as it does here for the prevention of criminal offences – does not invoke legal interests to determine the new purposes but rather refers to the nature of
the crimes it intends to prevent, the respective weightings that apply to data collection
under criminal procedural law are relevant here, too. Accordingly, the transfer of data
stemming from telecommunications surveillance measures is limited to the prevention of serious criminal offences, while the transfer of data stemming from the surveillance of private homes and remote searches is limited to the prevention of particularly
serious criminal offences (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279, <343 et seq.>; 125, 260 <328 and
329>; 129, 208 <243>; see also above, C IV 1 a). The provision, however, does not
stipulate such requirements with regard to the transfer of data.
347
Furthermore, in terms of the necessary degree of specificity of the risk situation, the
provision does not meet the constitutional requirements in all respects. By indiscriminately allowing a transfer of data as soon as there are “grounds for believing” that a
348
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