CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
general guidelines stipulate that international cooperation is conditional on
the receiving State respecting Swedish legislation. Foreign partners receive
information and training on the relevant content of Swedish legislation. As
the Inspectorate has a clear mandate to control the FRA’s international
cooperation, any change to its internal guidelines would not go unnoticed.
There are therefore clear safeguards against circumventing Swedish law.
217. In the Government’s view, Sweden’s system of supervision on
signals intelligence offered important safeguards. The Foreign Intelligence
Inspectorate is independent, has access to all relevant documents, examines
the selectors used and has the power to decide that data collection must
cease or the data collected be destroyed if the terms of the relevant permit
have not been complied with. The Inspectorate also ensures that the FRA is
only provided access to communications bearers insofar as such access is
covered by a permit. The Inspectorate submits annual public reports and is
subject to audit by the National Audit Office and supervision by the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice. As regards
personal data, the Swedish Data Protection Authority has general
supervisory functions. In the Government’s view, this kind of supervision
by independent non-judicial bodies is adequate and in conformity with the
Court’s case-law.
218. The Government submitted that between 2009 and 2018 the
Inspectorate had conducted 113 audits of the FRA resulting in 18 opinions.
At least seventeen of these audits served, inter alia, to control that the FRA
was using selectors in a way compatible with the permit issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Court and at least nine audits included issues of data
destruction. A number of audits also concerned the FRA’s handling of
personal data. Only very few observations or opinions ensued from the
audits. During the same time period, the Inspectorate carried out 141
controls at the request of an individual on whether his or her
communications had been the subject of unlawful signals intelligence. None
of those showed improper signals collection. There were also several
thematic reviews of the FRA’s activities, such as on compliance with the
limits imposed by the permits.
219. The Government also submitted that there are several remedies by
which an individual may initiate an examination of the lawfulness of
measures taken during the operation of the signals intelligence system.
These include a request to the Inspectorate which may result in notification
whether anything improper had taken place, a request to the FRA on
whether personal data concerning him or her has been processed,
applications to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, the Chancellor of Justice
and the Data Protection Authority, an action for damages and reporting a
matter for prosecution. Some of these remedies are not dependent on prior
notification being made to an individual. While systematic notification was
impossible, it is significant that the FRA is obliged to inform a natural