CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
existence of Swedish bulk interception legislation and activities is therefore
rejected.
B. Merits
1. The Chamber judgment
178. The Chamber found that the surveillance system clearly had a basis
in domestic law and was justified by national security interests. Indeed,
given the present-day threats of global terrorism and serious cross-border
crime, as well as the increased sophistication of communications
technology, the Court held that Sweden had considerable power of
discretion (“a wide margin of appreciation”) to decide on setting up such a
system of bulk interception. The State’s discretion in actually operating
such an interception system was narrower, however, and the Court had to be
satisfied that there were adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. It
assessed the minimum safeguards to avoid abuse of power, as developed in
its case-law and, in particular, in Roman Zakharov (cited above; see
paragraphs 99-115 of the Chamber judgment).
179. Overall, while the Chamber found some areas where there was
scope for improvement of the system, notably the regulation of the
communication of personal data to other States and international
organisations and the practice of not giving public reasons following a
review of individual complaints (see paragraphs 150, 173 and 177 of the
Chamber judgment), it considered that the system revealed no significant
shortcomings in its structure and operation. In this context, it noted that the
regulatory framework had been reviewed several times with a view to
enhancing protection of privacy and that it had in effect developed in such a
way that it minimised the risk of interference with privacy and compensated
for the lack of openness of the system (see paragraphs 180 and 181 of the
Chamber judgment).
180. More specifically, the scope of the interception and the treatment of
intercepted data were clearly defined in law; the duration of the measures
were clearly regulated (any permit was valid for a maximum of six months
and renewal required a new review); the authorisation procedure was
detailed and entrusted to a judicial body, the Foreign Intelligence Court;
there were several independent bodies, in particular the Foreign Intelligence
Inspectorate and the Data Protection Authority, tasked with the supervision
and review of the system; and, on request, the Inspectorate had to
investigate individual complaints of intercepted communications, as did the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice (see paragraphs
116-47 and 153-78 of the Chamber judgment).
181. The Chamber therefore found that the Swedish system of signals
intelligence provided adequate and sufficient guarantees against
arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. The relevant legislation met the “quality
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