CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
2. The parties’ submissions before the Grand Chamber
(a) The Government
155. The Government stated that the applicant did not belong to a
“group of persons or entities targeted by the legislation” on signals
intelligence within foreign intelligence.
156. In the Government’s view, furthermore, the contested legislation
did not directly affect all users of mobile telephone services and the internet
since it was restricted to foreign intelligence, and thereby foreign
circumstances.
157. Referring to the six stages of signals intelligence activities as
described by them (see paragraph 29 above), the Government claimed that
the applicant’s telephone and internet communications were unlikely to be
affected for the following reasons: the majority of purely domestic
communications would not pass the hand-over points in cross-border cables;
even if that happened, the selectors used to identify relevant signals are
designed with great precision as regards targeted foreign phenomena and the
selectors are subject to approval by the Foreign Intelligence Court; as a
result of the above, the applicant’s communications are unlikely to be sifted
out in the above automatic processing; any data passing through the
communications bearers that has not been selected disappears without any
possibility to be reproduced and examined by the FRA; even if the
applicant’s data or communications reached the third stage in the bulk
interception process, there will be then further refining through automatic
and manual means and the risk of the applicant’s communication being
retained for further scrutiny beyond that stage is virtually non-existent.
158. In the Government’s view, there is no interference with Article 8
rights until the stage when an analytical examination of selected signals is
possible.
159. The Government were also of the view that Swedish law affords
effective remedies for a person who suspects that he or she was subjected to
signals interception measures, including the possibility to file a request with
the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate and, as a result, obtain a notification
whether or not any improper data collection has taken place. In the
Government’s view, the Chamber’s insistence that there should be, in
addition to the above, “detailed grounds” given in response, was not based
on earlier case-law and unduly expanded the relevant requirements.
160. On this basis the Government considered that the applicant might
only claim to be a victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of
impugned legislation if it was able to show that, due to its “personal”
situation, it was potentially at risk of being subjected to signals intelligence
measures. That was far from being so. Quite to the contrary, the applicant’s
telephone and internet communications were unlikely to be intercepted and
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