CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
the content of a communication and that, consequently, a larger number of
individuals could have such data stored by the FRA.
79. Another finding in the report was that the FRA’s development
activities (see paragraph 24 above) could lead to non-relevant
communications being intercepted and possibly read or listened to by FRA
personnel. However, the Committee noted that the development activities
were directly essential for the FRA’s ability to conduct signals intelligence.
Moreover, information obtained through the development activities could be
used in regular intelligence activities only if such use conformed with the
purposes established by law and the relevant tasking directives issued for
the signals intelligence.
80. Like the Data Protection Authority, the Committee pointed out that,
in reality, the obligation on the FRA to notify individuals who had been
directly and personally subjected to secret surveillance measures was very
limited due to secrecy; it concluded therefore that this obligation served no
purpose as a guarantee for legal certainty or against integrity interferences.
The Committee found, however, that, in particular, the authorisation
procedure before the Foreign Intelligence Court, in deciding on permits to
conduct signals intelligence measures (see paragraphs 30-34 above), and the
supervisory functions performed by the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate
(see paragraphs 36 and 50-54 above) and the Privacy Protection Council
(see paragraph 55 above) provided important protection for individuals’
personal integrity. It noted, in this respect, that, although the Privacy
Protection Council formed part of the FRA, it acted in an independent
manner.
II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The United Nations
81. Resolution no. 68/167, on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,
adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013, reads as follows:
“The General Assembly,
...
4. Calls upon all States:
...
(c) To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance
of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, including
mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to upholding the right to
privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations under
international human rights law;
(d) To establish or maintain existing independent, effective domestic oversight
mechanisms capable of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for