CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
Does the massive movement of foreign football fans for a football
championship in Sweden justify monitoring all football fans from the
countries involved in the championship?
6. The purpose related to actions or intentions of a foreign power that
are of substantial importance for the Swedish foreign, security or defence
policy is very broadly phrased. It is clarified that “it is not sufficient that the
phenomenon is of general interest but that the intelligence should have a
direct impact on Swedish actions or positions in various foreign, security or
defence policy matters”10, but this clarification is insufficient, since it does
not delimit the threshold of materiality and the specific subject matters at
stake. It is also worrying that even the “intentions” of a foreign power may
justify the launching of a surveillance campaign, which opens the door for
monitoring of “alien” philosophical and religious Weltanschauungen.
Monitoring of the “causes”11 of ethnic, religious and political conflicts,
which is included in the purpose related to foreign conflicts with
consequences for international security, feeds into this same updated
Orwellian policy of thought control12.
7. The purpose related to “development activities”13 is a true legal black
hole, which has allowed for the interception and analysis of
communications which do not fall within the eight foreign-intelligence
purposes14. This is a blank cheque for monitoring “large segments of the
international signals traffic”15. The Government’s argument that these data
do not generate any intelligence reports but are vital in order to monitor the
“ever-changing signals environment, technical developments and signals
protection”16 is tantamount to saying that all internet communication should
be scrutinised so that the FRA can keep pace with the ever-changing
internet environment, technical developments and internet protection. This
is evidently absurd, but in practical terms it is what the Government is
claiming. The purposeless (that is, beyond the eight purposes of the law)
Ibid.
Ibid.
12 Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) Concluding observations
on the seventh report of Sweden, 28 April 2016, CCPR/C/SWE/CO/7, § 36, expressed
concern about “the limited degree of transparency with regard to the scope of surveillance
powers and the safeguards on their application”. I would point out that the UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism, 22 February 2016, A/HRC/31/65, § 43, was of the opinion that
“effective strategies should not be based on pre- or mis-conceptions about the groups that
are most susceptible to radicalisation or violent extremism, but should be developed in
reliance on evidence to ensure a proper understanding of the national and local issues that
impact on the radicalisation process.”
13 See paragraph 24 of this judgment.
14 As concluded by the report of the Signals Intelligence Committee (in paragraph 79 of this
judgment).
15 See paragraph 292 of this judgment.
16 The Government’s pleadings during the Grand Chamber hearing on 10 July 2019.
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