Judgment Approved by the court for handing down.
Davis & Ors v SSHD
or the tapes destroyed (see, inter alia, Huvig, cited above,
p. 56, § 34; Amann, cited above, § 76; Valenzuela
Contreras, cited above, pp. 1924-25, § 46; and Prado
Bugallo v. Spain, no. 58496/00, § 30, 18 February 2003).”
153. As to the question whether an interference was “necessary
in a democratic society” in pursuit of a legitimate aim, the
Court recalls that powers to instruct secret surveillance of
citizens are only tolerated under Article 8 to the extent that they
are strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions.
In practice, this means that there must be adequate and
effective guarantees against abuse. The assessment depends on
all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and
duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for
ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out
and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the
national law (see Klass and Others, cited above, §§ 49 to 50;
and Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 106).
154. The Court has acknowledged that the Contracting States
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the
existence and extent of such necessity, but this margin is
subject to European supervision. The Court has to determine
whether the procedures for supervising the ordering and
implementation of the restrictive measures are such as to keep
the “interference” to what is “necessary in a democratic
society”. In addition, the values of a democratic society must be
followed as faithfully as possible in the supervisory procedures
if the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2,
are not to be exceeded (see Kvasnica v. Slovakia, no. 72094/01,
§ 80, 9 June 2009).”
78.
The Strasbourg court decided that the scheme as set up by RIPA did not contravene
Article 8 of the ECHR. Its reasons set out in paragraphs 166 and 167 can be
summarised as acceptance of the protection provided by the Interception of
Communications Commissioner in his role, which included protection of the public
from wrongful access to their data, and the right of any individual who believed his
communications were being accessed to make an application to the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal.
79.
The ECtHR has not considered a case which concerns general retention of
communication data, as opposed to access to the data of a particular identified
individual. Mr Eadie makes the point that access to the content of communications is
more intrusive than access to communications data. But the ECtHR in Kennedy was
considering only access, and whether it interfered with ECHR Article 8 rights.
Different considerations apply to the retention regime and Article 8 of the Charter.
80.
The protection of personal data is an aspect of the right to respect for private and
family life set out in Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter: and if Article
7 of the EU Charter were the only aspect of EU law in play, there would be force in
the argument that the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts should be expected to march