Judgment Approved by the court for handing down

R (Bridges) v CCSWP and SSHD

“ 67. The mere storing of data relating to private life
of an individual amounts to an interference within the
meaning of art.8. The subsequent use of the stored
information has no bearing on that finding. However, in
determining whether the personal information retained
by the authorities involves any of the private-life aspects
mentioned above [e.g. aspects of the persons physical
and social identity], the Court will have due regard to
the specific context in which the information at issue
has been recorded and retained, the nature of the
records, the way in which these records are used and
processed and the results that may be obtained.”
“103. The protection of personal data is of
fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his
or her right to respect for private and family life, as
guaranteed by art.8 of the Convention. …”
(c.f also Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy v Finland (2018) 66 EHRR 8 at [137]).
56.

In S v. United Kingdom, the Court was concerned with the retention of biometric
information in the form of fingerprint records and DNA samples. It recognised
that each comprised a source of unique information about a person. We note in
particular what the Court said in respect of fingerprints since they are clearly a
source of significantly less personal data than a DNA sample. In the context of
rejecting an argument that retention of fingerprints did not involve any
interference with Article 8(1) rights because fingerprint analysis was an expert
process, the Court said (at [84]):
“84. … While true, this consideration cannot alter the
fact that fingerprints objectively contain unique
information about the individual concerned allowing his
or her identification with precision in a wide range of
circumstances. They are thus capable of affecting his or
her private life and retention of this information without
the consent of the individual concerned cannot be
regarded as neutral or insignificant.”

57.

For the purposes of the Article 8(1) argument, the same reasoning applies to
AFR technology. Like fingerprints and DNA, AFR technology enables the
extraction of unique information and identifiers about an individual allowing
his or her identification with precision in a wide range of circumstances.
Taken alone or together with other recorded metadata, AFR-derived biometric
data is an important source of personal information. Like fingerprints and
DNA, in the language later used by the Court at paragraph 104, it is
information of an “intrinsically private” character. The fact that the biometric

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