2012 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
The comprehensive error reports I have received during the year, supported when necessary by
thorough explanations during inspections, allows me to conclude none of the errors reported
were malicious or deliberate. Each error involved some kind of human error or system related
technical problem. In a large number of the 55 error cases, no intercept product was actually
obtained and therefore there was no unjustified or unnecessary intrusion. In the smaller number
of cases where intercept product was wrongly obtained, I have been assured that any such
product has been destroyed. In all cases the reporting agencies have taken steps to reduce the
risk of recurrence, whether this is achieved by further training or guidance or technical fixes to
systems.
Although I have explained that the increase in the number of errors is mainly down to two
factors, any increase in errors is extremely regrettable and I have stressed to those involved
the importance of reminding staff of the need to comply with the legislation, and to reform
procedures where necessary to minimise the risk of errors being repeated.
6.5 Inspection Results
This section deals with the outcomes of the inspections that I undertook in 2012 in relation to
lawful interception under Part I Chapter 1 of RIPA. I set out details of briefings I received during
each inspection visit, those whom I met, in broad terms what was discussed and my assessment
of compliance at each agency or department I oversee.
There are, however, a small number of items the disclosure of which in my public report may be
detrimental to national security. Any reasonable member of the public would agree that names of
targets and intelligence techniques cannot be disclosed because disclosure could harm national
security. This year I have again produced for the consideration of the Prime Minister, a confidential
annex to this open report containing further details of the policy and legal matters on which I
have been consulted by the agencies I oversee. It is my intention, subject to his agreement, to
distribute this annex to a select group of senior intelligence officials and Secretaries of State
engaged in interception.
6.5.1 GCHQ
My formal inspection visits to GCHQ took place in April and October 2012. I selected a number
of warrants of varied types to review. During my inspection visits I met the Director of GCHQ
and the Director General for Intelligence and Strategy.They briefed me as to the current level of
threat. I then scrutinised the selected warrants, with the assistance of the relevant case officers,
and discussed with GCHQ lawyers and other senior members of staff matters to which they
wished to draw my attention.
In addition, GCHQ legal advisers have taken the opportunity to discuss emerging capabilities
with me outside of the inspection visits. We also discussed the planning and preparation for the
2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Once again, it is my belief, based on my scrutiny of GCHQ authorisations, in addition to what I
have seen at both inspections and wider briefings, that GCHQ staff conduct themselves with the
highest levels of integrity and legal compliance.
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