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OIPR oversees the FBI’s minimization process in a similar fashion. OIPR attorneys visit the major FBI field offices and conduct a
detailed review of the surveillance logs. They also talk with the
surveillance monitors and supervisory personnel to determine
whether they understand the requirements or have identified particular problems or questions.
Should a violation of the minimization procedures occur by
either NSA

or FBI, a complete

report is made

to the FISA

Court,

the Attorney General, the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board,
and the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court also has a vital role
to play in the oversight of minimization. In addition to deciding in
each case whether the minimization procedures attached to the application meet the definition of minimization procedures contained
in FISA, the judge “may assess compliance with the minimization
procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, or disseminated.” (Section 105(d\X8) of FISA). This provision contemplates periodic examination by FISA judges of surveillance logs, intelligence disseminations, or other material relevant to an assessment of compli-

ance with the minimization procedures.
The

Senate

and

House

Intelligence

Committees,

of course,

also

oversee the minimization process. As with the other provisions of
the Act, this Committee has relied on the classified Attorney General reports and on extensive discussions with NSA, FBI, and OIPR
personnel to discharge its responsibilities in this area. Such discussions have included staff communications with FBI surveillance
monitors.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

In 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi, while testifying
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the proposed
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, stated:
Enactment

of the bill will, I believe,

provide

major

as-

surance to the public that electronic surveillance will be
used in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes
pursuant to carefully drawn legislative standards and procedures. The bill insures accountability for official action.
It compels the Executive to scrutinize such action at regular intervals. And it requires independent review at a critical point by a detached and neutral magistrate.
In providing statutory standards and procedures to
govern the use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes in this country and in establishing critical
safeguards to protect individual rights, the bill also insures
that the President will be able to obtain information essential to protection of the Nation against foreign threats.
While guarding against abuses in the future, it succeeds, I
trust, in avoiding the kind of over reaction against abuses
of the past that focuses solely on these abuses, but is care-

H. Rept. 98-738 ~ 2

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