80
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Home Office with a view to expanding the guidance in the CHIS CoP in relation to the
safeguarding considerations of juvenile CHIS.
Participation in Criminality
12.16
The use of any CHIS participating in criminality, with the approval of an authorising
officer, is also closely scrutinised during our inspections. This, again, is a tactic used very
infrequently. It invariably occurs where a CHIS reports an offence that is already being
planned or underway and use of the CHIS in a minor role allows the LEA to frustrate,
prevent or detect the offenders. Details of the recent Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT)
case on the lawfulness of the practice of MI5 authorising agents to participate in crime
are set out in paragraph 8.10. Although the majority judgment of the IPT held there was a
power for MI5 to authorise CHIS to participate in crime, the case highlights the absence of
a clear legal framework governing participation in crime. Although the policy response to
any judgment is for the Government, we have been involved in discussions with the Home
Office about the possible outcomes of the IPT case (which is now pending consideration
by the Court of Appeal) and whether enhanced or additional oversight may need to be
introduced as a result (see also Legal and Policy, chapter 2).
Relevant sources
12.17
The enhanced authorisation and oversight regime in relation to relevant sources, also
known as undercover officers, came about as a result of concern regarding how this form
of covert activity was being managed, following several revelations regarding historic cases
and a number of police internal investigations.
Figure 3: Relevant source notifications, renewals and cancellations, 2015 to 2019
1,400
1,200
1,155
1,000
800
902
1,158
1,032
769
696
600
757
598
752
668
Notifications
Cancellations
Renewals
400
200
0
12.18
72
93
1 April 2015 - 1 April 2016 31 March 2016 31 March 2017
51
51
53
Annualised
for 2017
2018
2019
We have found that the issue highlighted below in relation to long-term authorisations is
particularly prevalent with online undercover operatives. These can often require a law
enforcement presence online in relation to crimes such as child sexual exploitation and
abuse, terrorism and extremism, for several years. It is also true to say that interaction
online with persons who are not committing offences is often fleeting and is a more
nebulous relationship than when conducted in the ‘real world’. The enhanced regime