Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
in the CAB that will oversee compliance with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 (RIPA)27 and quality assure submissions to the AO.
12.11
Historically, we have been concerned about the length of time it has taken to assess
the suitability of a potential CHIS before granting an authorisation, whilst still accepting
intelligence from the source. This is known as ‘status drift’ and remains an aspect of
concern, with occasional cases taking too long before authorisation is sought and granted.
This is normally where the LEA in question is seeking to ensure that the source is able to
provide intelligence that meets their requirement and to comply with handling instructions,
and that the risk (to the CHIS and the LEA) is acceptable.
12.12
Managing CHIS cases is necessarily one of the most bureaucratic forms of covert activity
in order to create a comprehensive record of the relationship between the CHIS and the
LEA, the acquisition and management of intelligence, and the risk assessment. Increasingly
we find that there is some unnecessary repetition of details in different records, or most
frequently at reviews of cases, where there is a failure to focus on activity that has taken
place during the period under review. Instead details from initial applications are restated.
The danger with this is that an important fact may not be picked up by a reader as it is
buried amongst the extraneous detail.
12.13
A significant CHIS error was reported by HMRC in 2019 (see paragraphs 18.3 to 18.4).
In brief, HMRC was applying an outdated policy relating to their interaction with witnesses
who assisted in a large number of investigations. This meant that the person assisting
HMRC met the criteria for authorisation as a CHIS but was not so authorised. A full review
was conducted by HMRC and they briefed us on this at our inspection. We conducted a
follow-up inspection six months later to ensure that all the necessary remedial action was
being taken. We found that a thorough programme of training, re-education and policy
changes had been implemented. We recognise that HMRC faces some cultural challenges in
embedding the training and education and we will monitor progress at future inspections.
Juvenile CHIS
12.14
In the very rare instances when a juvenile is authorised as a CHIS, we conduct a close
examination of the case. We examine every such case at inspection and focus on the safety
and welfare of the juvenile and check that the use and tasking (conduct) is not endangering
the CHIS or leading the juvenile to associate with criminals and environments that they
would not otherwise encounter.
Case study: juvenile covert human intelligence source (CHIS)
In one such case, a juvenile was carrying out activity on behalf of a “county line” drug supply
group. The juvenile owed money to the group and approached the police wishing to provide
information. A referral under the Modern Slavery Act was made by the police and a care plan
was drawn up with Children’s Services, including relocating the juvenile and finding them a
training course. Once this had been done, as an authorised CHIS, the juvenile was able to
provide intelligence to the police regarding the ‘county line’ crime group.
12.15
In June 2019, we met a member of the Children’s Commissioner’s Policy Team to discuss
our oversight of this especially sensitive technique, and we are in discussions with the
27 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (RIP(S)A) regulates the use of surveillance and
CHIS in Scotland.
79