78
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Figure 2: CHIS authorisations, 2017 – 2019
3,000
2,651
2,500
2,000
1,958
1,866
2018
2019
1,500
1,000
500
0
12.9
2017 (Annualised)
There are numerous examples of where CHIS intelligence and undercover operative activity
has been instrumental in preventing and detecting crime.
Example 1: Use of CHIS intelligence
A group of burglars were committing a series of offences involving violent confrontation of
victims; a CHIS identified the group and this intelligence was passed to the force concerned,
allowing investigators to gather the evidence needed to arrest and prosecute the offenders.
Example 2: Use of CHIS intelligence
A CHIS reported on a person who was supplying firearms to criminals. This allowed a proactive
operation to be mounted and successfully disrupted the supply of firearms.
Example 3: Use of CHIS intelligence
Undercover operatives, deployed online at sites where paedophiles exchange information and
images, were able to identify numerous persons, including several who at the time had access
to children.
Example 4: Use of CHIS intelligence
Undercover operatives ‘befriended’ a person suspected of being an Islamic extremist and were
able to gather evidence of a terrorist attack being planned by this person and arrest him.
12.10
The vast majority of LEAs have staff dedicated to the management of CHIS and governance
of the structures and processes implemented for this purpose. CHIS are typically managed
by Dedicated Source Handling Units (or units with similar names), with officers designated
as “handlers” and supervisors designated as “controllers”. A senior officer will be appointed
as the Authorising Officer (AO, Superintendent or equivalent). There will also often be staff