Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
12.5
We have identified training, particularly for officers of the Covert Authorities Bureau (CAB),
as a point of vulnerability. Training remains paramount to ensure compliance and improving
or enhancing the provision should often be the first step in response to recommendations.
However, there appears to be little in the way of a training programme to support CAB staff,
and across all covert disciplines there appears to be a shortage of national training courses
available. Through our inspections, and from discussions with individual officers, we have
found that continuous professional development of all staff is key to ensuring compliance.
We hope to see a focus on training at a national level as the need to support transition of
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) eases.
12.6
In general, we found that the LEAs are making good use of interception tactics across
a range of operational requirements and were becoming more ambitious in their use
of thematic warrants to disrupt firearms-enabled criminality. Our oversight of thematic
warrants has shown that they are being used well, and internal documentation is of a good
standard. Use of interception in general has adhered to the Code of Practice (CoP) and the
intercepting agencies have made improvements to their processes to accommodate the
requirements of the IPA.
12.7
Turning to communications data (CD), overall the transition to the Office of
Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA) and the IPA has been successful, with the
standard of written consideration in authorisations being granted by OCDA on par, and
in many cases, better than that seen previously in LEAs. Of course, the process now
provides the public additional confidence that applications to acquire CD are considered
independently. LEAs retain the power to grant authorisations in urgent circumstances
involving threats to life, or where an opportunity to seize critical evidence or make an
arrest for serious crime could be lost. Whilst we have, and will continue to focus on, urgent
applications, we have found no instances where the use of the urgency provisions has
been unjustified.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS)
12.8
The acquisition of intelligence by CHIS is a core function of LEAs. The term “CHIS”
encompasses both members of the public who provide intelligence to the LEA and
“relevant sources”, which is the statutory term used to describe staff from a designated
LEA that are trained to act as undercover operatives and are subject to an enhanced
authorisation and oversight regime. For clarity the former category will be referred to
simply as CHIS and the latter as “undercover operatives”.
77