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proportionality considerations. Such applications require a greater level of consideration
to be documented on internal records: the intended methodology should clearly be
recorded, as well as the anticipated scale of the activity, so that the AO can make a fully
considered decision. In some cases, we felt that GCHQ could legally conduct planned
operations without authorisation under RIPA and so we questioned whether some of the
online conduct being authorised by GCHQ required a directed surveillance authorisation
(DSA). We noted that any DSA casework produced in these debatable cases must still be of
a high standard.
10.13
It was disappointing that only limited progress had been made in relation to previous
recommendations regarding the lack of written input from AOs. GCHQ’s forms for
initial authorisation and renewal of directed surveillance do not provide space for AOs
to comment on the necessity, proportionality or collateral intrusion. The scope for
improvement is limited until these forms are redesigned.
10.14
We also saw little improvement in review procedures for existing authorisations, which
are required under the Code of Practice (CoP). GCHQ has provided additional guidance and
training but this is not yet widely evident in the authorisations scrutinised. We have offered
to assist GCHQ in providing further training or awareness sessions for authorising officers.
Property interference
10.15
GCHQ conducted very little activity under section 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994
(ISA) in 2019. During our inspection we reviewed casework for a small number of warrants
and received briefings from the teams working under those authorisations. We were
satisfied that each warrant was necessary and proportionate and that the considerations in
each case were well set out.
Targeted equipment interference
Use of general descriptors
10.16
We examined a number of thematic warrants where a general descriptor had been used
(see chapter 2). We found that the explanation of why it was not reasonably practicable
to name or describe all the individuals was not well made on two general descriptor
warrants we examined. We observed that a clear and rational explanation must be made
with respect to this matter in all relevant thematic warrants and must be set out clearly for
these two warrants at renewal. We noted similar issues at SIS and several law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) and expect this to be rectified as applicants become more familiar with the
application templates and requirements of the legislation and CoP.
10.17
We noted that GCHQ was making use of set descriptions of conduct to be authorised in
EI warrant applications and renewals, although in some cases not all described conduct
was intended or necessary and a more narrowly defined description of the conduct could
have been used without jeopardising the operational utility of the warrant. Although the
more limited conduct which GCHQ intended to carry out was made clear in the body of the
applications, the more extensive description of conduct appeared on the schedule to the
warrant. GCHQ explained that the description of conduct to be authorised was contained in
a form of words on a template that had been mandated by the Home Office. Our enquiries
with the Home Office revealed that this was not the case and that GCHQ were not bound
by the forms of words in template documents. GCHQ’s template has now been updated.
There is no suggestion that any unnecessary conduct occurred under these warrants.