Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
9.10
We have previously commented on the difficulties experienced by SIS in separating
the statutory roles required for CHIS management, namely; the handler, controller
and authorising officer. At times there are not enough officers of the right seniority to
fulfil each of these roles separately within a single business area. This is because SIS is
structured into small subject-specific units which are discrete for security reasons. SIS has
now made changes to their guidance and practice to ensure that the controlling officer
will be separate from the handler, and the authorising officer will be senior to, and in the
management chain of, the handler.
Participation in criminality (PIC)
9.11
SIS has informed us that were it to be necessary for one of their agents to participate in
criminality in the UK, this would be authorised via the MI5 PIC process. We cannot confirm
the extent (if any) of such activity by SIS. However, we can state that our inspection of their
CHIS casework did not identify any relevant issues and did not include any casework that
was not compliant with this policy.
Juvenile CHIS
9.12
As noted for the other UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) agencies, we are satisfied that SIS
has policies in place regarding the recruitment and running of juvenile CHIS.
Surveillance
9.13
SIS conducts very little covert surveillance in the UK. We found that their directed
surveillance authorisation (DSA) casework set out a clear case for the necessity and
proportionality of the covert surveillance. However, as we noted at MI5, the consideration
recorded by authorising officers on DSA forms, as well as the internal review processes,
are inadequate (see paragraph 8.15). Reviews are conducted in a sporadic and inconsistent
manner and so we have recommended improvements in this area.
Property interference
9.14
SIS continues to conduct minimal activity in the UK under section 5 of the ISA. We
examined a small number of warrants and were content that the operations outlined were
necessary and proportionate and were properly authorised.
Targeted interception (TI) and Equipment interference (EI)
9.15
SIS uses targeted interception and targeted equipment interference (TEI) warrants and
does not presently rely on bulk warrants for interception or equipment interference. We
inspected SIS’s use of interception and equipment interference in July 2019 and found that
overall SIS demonstrated a high level of compliance with the IPA and CoP.
Thematic warrants
9.16
We examined a selection of thematic TEI warrants. These were broad in scope but the
number of deployments under the warrants was low and each deployment was conducted
under an internal approval. We were satisfied that the internal approvals we inspected
contained careful assessments of necessity and proportionality. We identified a small
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