Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
consideration given to such activity by case officers, managers, operational security advisors
and legal advisors before any such activity is approved. We are content that MI5 policy was
correctly followed in every case that we inspected.
8.12
MI5’s policy requires officers clearly to set out and record parameters for CHIS behaviours
which might involve criminal activity. It remains the case, however, that authorising officers
do not always lay out clear parameters under which the CHIS may operate and we have
recommended that there should be greater consistency in this area. We have also noted
that PIC authorisation documents are not subject to review, update or cancellation, as
would be the case for the RIPA authorisations in place for the CHIS they relate to. We have
observed that this would be a useful discipline, although we understand that this is not a
requirement under the policy.
8.13
In respect of PIC conducted by CHIS online, MI5 has sought to authorise the online persona
rather than the individual CHIS that would be undertaking the activity. We believe that
this leaves room for some confusion and inconsistency in approach. We anticipate that a
change in line with the general authorisation of individual CHIS rather than personas would
be beneficial.
Juvenile CHIS
8.14
The use of underage individuals as agents is a sensitive area of work and we are unable
to disclose whether any of the intelligence agencies or Ministry of Defence have recruited
individuals under the age of 18. Irrespective of whether they had any active casework, we
would expect each agency to maintain appropriate policies and practices that would ensure
that any such agents were properly handled and protected. We are satisfied that MI5 has
policies in place regarding the recruitment and running of juvenile CHIS.
Directed Surveillance
8.15
We raised a concern with MI5 in 2018 in relation to their review processes for directed
surveillance authorisations (DSAs). We found that MI5 did not have an adequate review
process in place for this commonly used power, which meant that authorising officers were
not properly setting out their considerations of necessity, proportionality and collateral
intrusion for continued operations during the period for which a DSA was authorised.
We advised MI5 that their informal, often verbal, review processes fell short of the
requirements of the Code of Practice (CoP). We also highlighted a lack of specificity on
documentation for authorisations that covered a range of powers: MI5’s renewal casework
commonly did not justify the continued use of the full range of techniques and cancellation
records often lacked detail regarding the activity undertaken and value to the investigation
and operation.
Definition: directed surveillance
Directed surveillance is covert but not carried out in residential premises or private vehicles,
this could include the covert monitoring of a person/people of interest.
8.16
We have challenged MI5’s policy of noting authorising officer comments for surveillance
only in exceptional cases. In the vast majority of cases, this means that there is no record
of any consideration by the authorising officer. We recommended that it would be more
appropriate for a routine notation of considerations to be made in each case. We believe
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